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MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE IN A REALIST AGE 
VICfORIAF. NOURSEt 
How is constitutional doctrine made? Why do some words 
emerge as constitutional necessities while others fade from memory? 
Even if we assume that all doctrine is and will continue to be formal, 
why do courts choose the formalisms that they do? To these large 
questions, there are no simple answers. Constitutional doctrine spills 
from the pages of the federal reporters every day, covering oceans of 
subject matter so vast that no single theory could possibly navigate it 
all. And, yet, scholars have been trying of late to articulate theories of 
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the modern doctrinal enterprise. From right, left, and in between, 
they have recently joined hands to warn us of a "new formalism": 
that, for better or worse, doctrine is becoming more, rather than less, 
formal and, as a result, less accessible to the people. 1 
This focus on the "new formalism" leaves a number of questions 
unanswered about why we choose the doctrinal vocabularies that we 
do. Consider a court that creates a new doctrinal rule by focusing on 
a "clear and compelling interest" or the "reasonable expectations" of 
the parties. 2 The court is not trying to be more formalistic or obscure; 
indeed, the court is unlikely to be conscious of its doctrinal art. 
Judges are too busy relying upon these terms to assume anything but 
that doctrine may be made this way-that it is appropriate to focus 
upon "interests" rather than "claims," or that there is great 
significance in choosing the adjective "compelling" rather than 
"substantial." Even if unconscious, these moves are nevertheless of 
extraordinary importance. And perhaps because of their importance, 
we find it difficult to remind ourselves that we are leaning upon 
something contingene-that if the law books of the past fifty years 
1 See Daniel A. Farber, Missing the "Play of Intelligence", 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 147, 
149 (1994) (decrying the increasing "bureaucratic" flavor of Supreme Court writing); 
Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Foreword: The Constitution of Change: 
Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 98 (1993) 
(describing the Court as "trapped in the grips of mechanical jurisprudence"); Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation: 
Some Modest Proposals from the Twenty-Third Century, 59 ALB. L. REV. 671, 674-76 (1995) 
("The Supreme Court's present style of constitutional discourse is the practical 
equivalent ... of the Yangs' inarticulate grunts."); Richard A. Posner, judges' Writing 
Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1442-43 (1995) (criticizing the 
"pure" style of opinion writing, with its multi-factor tests, as retarding the search for 
real meaning); see also ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY 
AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 121-55 (1989) (arguing that modern consti-
tutional doctrine is "formulaic"). But see Frederick Schauer, opinions as Rules, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 1455, 1456-59 (1995) (agreeing with Professors Farber, Horwitz, and 
Nagel that Supreme Court opinions have developed a bureaucratic, formulaic style, 
but arguing that there is nothing particularly unfortunate about this). 
2 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 895 (1990) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring in judgment) (describing the "compelling interest" test in religion clause 
cases as barring "encroachments upon [religious] liberty, whether direct or indirect, 
unless required by clear and compelling governmental interests" (citation omitted)); 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (focusing 
the question of whether there is a "search" under the Fourth Amendment on a 
reasonable person's "expectation" of privacy). 
' Cf LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 12e-14e (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. 
von Wright eds., Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1969) (noting the error of 
saying that we have a belief that the world started more than five minutes ago, a matter 
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were destroyed by cataclysm or fire, many of our most revered 
constitutional concepts would be gone. 
Why is it that, if Justice Holmes were resurrected tomorrow, he 
would need a translator of sorts to explain the new world of 
constitutional tests and factors and scrutinies? Would it be enough to 
explain that doctrine had simply become "formulaic" or 
"bureaucratic" or "methodologically obsessed"?4 In what follows, I 
consider a different hypothesis: Doctrine is not simply random word-
choice, but reflected job description. If doctrine has changed, it has 
changed because the modern Court sees its institutional strengths 
and weaknesses differently than it did in an earlier era. Mter a 
century spent debunking the common law ideal5 in the name of 
"realism,"6 it would be odd, indeed, if modern constitutional doctrine 
on which few will have formulated a belief, not because the fact is doubted, but 
because we are too busy relying upon it to go about doubting it). 
• See, e.g., NAGEL, supra note 1, at 128 (describing the modern formulaic style as 
"an amalgam of the bureaucratic and the academic"); Farber, supra note 1, at 150-52 
(describing the bureaucratic features of modern constitutional doctrine); Horwitz, 
supra note 1, at 98-99 (arguing that contemporary Supreme Court opinions are dense 
with various "methodological obsessions"). 
5 See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 21, 165, 170-225 (1993) (recounting the sea change over the century in 
the ideas "taught in [law] schools, practiced in [law] firms, and made by judges in 
courts" away from a pragmatic program that viewed the work "of lawyers through the 
prism of the common law"); see also GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 104 
(1977) ("In the 1970s we look back on an unpleasant half century which has been 
largely devoted to destroying the illusions which had commended themselves to the 
men of the 1870s."). 
' Let me emphasize at the outset that I am using the term "realism" in its popular-
ized sense. By that, I refer to a set of ideas that have filtered through legal education 
as "realism," however crude or naive these ideas may seem when compared to the 
actual historical record. On realism generally and its influence on legal thought and 
education, see AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 49 (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993) 
(compiling and summarizing selected original sources viewed today as essential to the 
Realist movement); NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 65-159, 65 
(1995) ("American legal realism is one of the great paradoxes of modern jurispru-
dence. No other jurisprudential tendency of the twentieth century has exerted such a 
powerful influence on legal thinking while remaining so ambiguous, unsettled and 
undefined."); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169-268 (1992) ("The most important legacy 
of Realism ... was its challenge to the orthodox claim that legal thought was separate 
and autonomous from moral and political discourse."); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL 
REALISM AT YALE 1927-1960, at 3, 33-34 (1986) ("The [legal] realists pointed to the role 
of human idiosyncracy in legal decision making, stressed the uselessness of legal rules 
and concepts, and emphasized the importance of greater efficiency and certainty in 
law administration."); and KRONMAN, supra note 5, at 185-225 (stating that "[w]hat the 
realists all opposed was the conception of legal science that Langdell had offered as a 
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had not become self-conscious of the possibility of doctrinal failure. 
What has gone unnoticed, however, is how courts' new self-
consciousness has influenced constitutional doctrine itself-how 
courts' embrace of the scrutiny of interests rather than the assertion 
of powers, their fondness for methodological queries rather than 
seriatim citation, reflects a peculiarly modern7 institutional self-doubt. 
In other words, our answer to the resurrected Justice Holmes may be 
that doctrinal rhetoric has changed, at least in part, because this 
century has witnessed a revolution in courts' image of themselves and 
of doctrine itself. 
In what follows, I consider three examples of modern 
constitutional doctrine that show how judges have stolen bits and 
pieces from popularized skepticisms about the job of judging and 
have molded this stolen rhetoric into doctrine. In the first example, I 
ask whether constitutional law's recent penchant for doctrinal rules 
based on "clear law" could have existed without the modern age's 
obsession with legal uncertainty.8 In the second, I consider whether 
our contemporary rhetoric of constitutional "interests" and 
"expectations" reflects modern critiques of doctrine as failing to 
address social needs.9 In the third, I ask how an offhand reference to 
the term "fundamental" could come to describe a legal category 
defined by courts' own fears of illegitimacy except in an age self-
conscious of the judiciary's institutional weaknesses. 10 If I am right 
about these examples, it may be that what was once said of modern 
painting's abstraction-that whatever else it was about, it was "'about 
painting"' 11-is true of modern doctrine's abstraction as well: that it 
model for the work of the new law school professoriate that he himself did so much to 
create"). 
7 I use the term "modern" despite our advancement to a postmodern age since I 
believe that the doctrinal institution's sense of legitimacy hails from a period earlier 
than our own, a period in which judges of the post-war period received their legal 
education. See GILMORE, supra note 5, at 87 ("And it should be borne in mind that 
what is taught in the law schools in one generation will be widely believed by the bar in 
the following generation."). 
8 See infra Part II (discussing the development of rules governing constitutional 
remedies that require courts to dismiss the constitutional claim if the right claimed is 
not "clearly established"). 
9 See infra Part III (discussing doctrinal rules that depend upon the "expectations" 
or "interests" of the parties). 
10 See infra Part IV (discussing contemporary readings of Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
u.s. 535 (1942)). 
11 David Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1656, 1661 (1986) (quoting 
STANLEY CAVELL, MusicDiswmposed, in MUST WE MEANWHATWESAY? 207 (1969)). 
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is about doctrine and doctrine's struggle in an age self-conscious of 
the possibility of doctrinal failure. 
Obviously, these three examples cannot prove that doctrinal 
rhetoric reflects a history of shifting institutional ideals or that 
doctrine has absorbed a kind of institutional self-criticism. But as 
long as theories are being constructed,12 I think it is worth 
considering an approach that neither romanticizes past ages nor 
repeats familiar criticisms. 13 Modern constitutional doctrine presents 
an important question of collective action: How do large groups of 
people end up speaking the same constitutional language when that 
language changes over time? One plausible answer is that doctrine is 
a practice that develops within institutions, not simply as the random 
acts of individual judges. 14 Indeed, those who study institutions from 
a distance have long understood that institutions are maintained, 
over time, by squeezing ideas into a common shape, a shape that 
carries forward, unacknowledged, an ideal picture of the institution.15 
These ideals become the default image, sustaining the institution's 
perceived identity relative to other institutions. When those images 
are challenged, the institution uses its traditional methods (here, the 
doctrinal category) to tame the critique, but, in doing so, 
recapitulates the institutional challenge (here, within the doctrine 
created). 
In Part I, I set my position in context, surveying briefly those who 
have tried to capture modern doctrinal practice in larger 
constitutional frames. In Parts II, III, and IV, I recount three 
different doctrinal histories, arguing that each has been 
fundamentally shaped by courts' self-consciousness of the failures of a 
12 See supra note 1. 
" See infra Part I (arguing that many contemporary complaints about "formulaic" 
doctrine repeat arguments made at the beginning of the century by the realists). 
14 See Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Creating Legal Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1989, 2030 (1996) ("OJurisprudence tends to speak of 'the judge,' as if America had 
only one of them, operating in lordly isolation."); see also PHILIP BOBBITI, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 163-70, 179 (1991) (arguing that constraints on 
judging emanate from rules of practice shared by the judiciary as a whole). 
15 See MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK 55 ( 1986) (" [F] or discourse to be 
possible at all, the basic categories have to be agreed on. Nothing else but institutions 
can define sameness. Similarity is an institution. Elements get assigned to sets where 
institutions find their own analogies in nature."); see also MARTHA MIN OW, MAKING ALL 
THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 79-80 ( 1990) (agreeing 
with Douglas that" [i]nstitutions establish what count as correct and incorrect patterns 
of thought"). 
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common law ideal of judging.16 As the histories show, by 
doctrinalizing the critique (for example, by cabining the critique of 
indeterminacy in a rule that depends upon finding "unclear law"), 
this method accomplishes two seemingly incompatible ends: 
Doctrine (1) acknowledges critique; and (2) cabins it within 
categorical boundaries, leaving a place, outside those boundaries, 
where older ideals may flourish (where law is indeed "clear"). The 
result is that, when we go to draw the doctrinal lines, we find 
ourselves enmeshed in difficult questions of institutional identity (to 
apply the "clear law" rule, for example, we end up having to decide 
what counts as "law"17). I conclude in Part V by suggesting that, if 
doctrinal practice18 operates like other social institutions, we should 
expect to see doctrine trying to respond to its critics, including the 
"realist" ones/9 even if this effort recapitulates familiar struggles.20 If 
there is a certain inevitability to all this, there are also obvious 
dangers. Cases themselves cannot be skeptical; inevitably, courts 
16 Only in the past few years have scholars attempted to reverse the century's 
hostility toward common law decisionmaking ideals in constitutional law. See CAss R. 
SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 77-79 (1996) ("To the extent 
that the common law generally respects freedom of contract, private property, and 
private ordering, it has many virtues from the standpoint of efficiency. Common law 
judgments also reflect intelligible understandings of liberty."); David A. Strauss, 
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996) (promoting the 
common law approach to understanding American constitutional law). 
17 See infra Part II (discussing issues raised by the "clear law" rule). 
18 What I mean by "practice" is simply that doctrine is something that people "do" 
as well as a set of directives or rules. And, as something that people "do," doctrine 
(like any other practice) is subject to the incentives and limits of the institutional 
structures in which it is created, structures that reflect both the nature of courts 
(doctrine's site) relative to other institutions, as well as influences from other, less 
formal, legal institutions such as the academy (doctrine's antagonist). See infra Part V. 
To see that doctrine is itself an institution acknowledges the ultimate power of the 
three principal decisionmaking institutions (courts, legislatures, and administration) 
to shape legal culture, but it rejects the notion that we have three, and only three, 
legal institutions worth studying. 
19 I do not say this to blame theory, or realism, for doctrine's failures. (To the 
extent my own work relies on empirical analysis, see Victoria Nourse, Passion 5 Progress: 
Modem Law &form and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE LJ. 1331 (1997), it falls in a 
direct line from realist premises.) I say it to try to give new life to something that Karl 
Llewellyn once wisely insisted upon-an understanding of law as an institution. See 
Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17 (1934) 
("Every living constitution is an institution .... "). 
20 As Mary Douglas has explained, when we choose particular concepts, we are 
"also picking and choosing at the same time their allies and opponents and the 
pattern of their future relations," a process that tends to cause arguments to repeat 
themselves in different rhetorical guises. DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 63. 
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21 • ' decide. A court that truly seeks to incorporate th1s century s 
"realism"-that assumes all doctrine is uncertain or relative-cannot 
decide. A court that tames some popular critiques by putting 
conceptual edges around them (for example, by turning 
indeterminacy into a doctrinal search for "unclear" law) may still 
come to a resolution, but stops along the way to engage in a battle 
about its own image that may be unnecessary and divertingly self-
involved. The danger here is that a court will mistake its own 
institutional struggles for the real-life struggles of the litigants before 
it, replacing the nineteenth century's constitutional arrogance with a 
modern constitutional narcissism. 
I. STUDYING MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 
Contemporary scholarship has devoted little effort to considering 
the ways courts make constitutional doctrine. If we put to the side, 
for the moment, normative critiques of particular doctrines22 and 
focus on efforts to take a more general view, three approaches stand 
out. First, there are those who have sought to identify a modern style 
of opinionwriting, and whose efforts have been largely, although not 
uniformly, critical of an increasingly "formulaic" doctrine.23 Second, 
there are those who have emphasized the Supreme Court's audience 
and, again, who have been largely critical of the ways in which 
modern constitutional doctrine excludes "we the people."24 Finally, 
there are those who have focused on constitutional rhetoric, arguing 
that the real object of study should be neither aesthetics nor 
audience, but rather the ways in which doctrine masks and shapes as 
it persuades.25 Unfortunately, although each of these approaches has 
something to say about how doctrine is made, none provides us with a 
ready answer as to why modern doctrine looks and feels "different" 
21 The "case" brings to bear pressures different in nature and kind from those 
brought to bear on the reasoning processes of markets, legislatures, or bureaucracies. 
See NEIL K KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATiVES 125-28 (1994) (comparing the institu-
tional biases of markets, legislatures, and courts). It requires a decision. See BOBBITT, 
supra note 14, at 183 (noting that cases "require a decision, not a calculation or an 
interpretation, or even a passionate conviction"). 
22 Some of these, of course, have been extraordinarily powerful. See, e.g., T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE LJ. 943, 943-44 
(1987) (exploring and evaluating "a form of constitutional reasoning-balancing-
that has become widespread, if not dominant, over the last four decades"). 
" See infra notes 27-35 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text. 
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from that of earlier eras. Indeed, each approach, in its own way, 
seems vaguely repetitive of arguments borrowed from an earlier era.26 
A. Style, Audience, Rhetoric 
To the extent scholars have tried to enumerate a modern 
constitutional style,27 they have focused on what Professor Nagel 
insightfully dubbed, almost a decade ago, the "formulaic 
constitution."28 The idea that modern constitutional doctrine has 
acquired a peculiarly formalistic style was echoed in 1993 by Professor 
Horwitz in an incisive discussion of the Supreme Court's term,29 and 
again, recently, in elegant essays by Professor Farber,so Professor 
Schauer,31 and Judge Posner.32 These scholars are surely right that 
part of the reason that modern doctrine looks and feels different is its 
layered reasoning style,33 with its dull penchant for what Professor 
26 Recently, Professors Rubin and Feeley have suggested a phenomenological 
approach to the "making" of doctrine which may prove a powerful new addition to the 
debate, but has yet to percolate through the academy. To some extent, my focus on 
institutions fits well with their approach, although my historical efforts are quite 
distinct from theirs. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 14, at 1991 (presenting a "theory 
of judicial lawmaking ... based upon phenomenology"). 
27 Llewellyn seems to have been right when he cautioned that "'[s]tyle' in analysis 
of great-institutions, is tricky. It needs vigilance lest it move into ... word-slinging." 
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 519 n.16 
(1960). 
28 NAGEL, supra note 1, at 121. 
29 See Horwitz, supra note 1, at 98 ("[M]ost of this Court's opinions ... [make] 
amazingly fine distinctions that produce multiple opinions designated in Parts, sub-
parts, and sub-sub-parts .... "). But see Schauer, supra note 1, at 1459-66 (arguing 
against the idea that there is anything so terrible about opinions that bear such a 
"style"). 
"' See Farber, supra note 1, at 150 ("Bluntly, much of what the Court produces 
these days lacks the qualities of good legal writing."). 
" See Schauer, supra note 1, at 1457-59 (acknowledging the descriptive accuracy of 
claims concerning the "formulaic" style but arguing against the idea that such a style 
hinders constitutional decisionmaking). 
52 See Posner, supra note 1, at 1429-32 (concluding that most contemporary judicial 
opinions are in the "pure style," a style that is neither plain nor transparent, but 
artificial, technical, and impersonal). 
" Much of the recent discussion on the "style" question, from both the left and 
the right, has focused on the "layered look" of modern constitutional doctrine. See, 
e.g., NAGEL, supra note 1, at 128 (arguing that the Court's formulae share characteris-
tics of "administrative rules and guidelines ... [b]oth are complex, layered and 
equivocal"); Horwitz, supra note 1, at 98 (arguing that the Court's product has ac-
quired a "thick undergrowth of technicality," "[w]ith three and four 'prong' tests 
everywhere and for everything; with an almost medieval earnestness about 
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Farber has termed the "inscrutable instructions" that typically 
accompany tax forms.34 Each author has provided a rich 
understanding of the aesthetics of modern opinionwriting in 
constitutional and other cases. On the other hand, identifYing 
"formulas-as-formulas" as the distinctive feature of modern doctrine35 
does not move us much beyond the realists' own screeds against 
formulaic conceptualism.36 Mter a century of doctrinal criticism, 
must our understanding stop with the notion that constitutional 
doctrine is "formulaic"? 
Those seeking a modern constitutional style are not the only ones 
who have sought to examine doctrinal forms by taking a longer view. 
A number of scholars who otherwise share little in intellectual interest 
or temperament have suggested that we need to look at constitutional 
doctrine as a form of argument directed to particular audiences.37 
Although reaching no uniform conclusion, some of the most incisive 
work argues that modern constitutional doctrine has little 
consciousness of its audience, and, as a result, fails to communicate 
an "intelligible constitution."38 No doubt this is true, just as it is true 
classification and categorization"); see also Farber, supra note 1, at 149 (echoing these 
concerns). 
" Farber, supra note 1, at 152. 
" See NAGEL, supra note 1, at 121 (arguing that "the formulaic style is one of the 
few basic fixtures" of modern constitutional doctrine). 
'" See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 57 (1936) ("We lawyers are 
still held in the bonds of 'holy words' in the form of rules, principles, formulas and 
standards, reduced to well-polished phrases." (referring to the claims of Leon 
Green)); id. at 118 (decrying "the insistent effort to achieve predictability by the 
attempt to mechanize law, to reduce it to formulas"); Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic 
Jurisprudenc!!-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 431, 439 (1930) ("The statement 'this is 
the rule' typically means: 'I find this formula of words in authoritative books.'"); see also 
HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 208 ("In much of the critical literature of Legal Realism, 
conceptualism is identified as the primary disease, accused of causing intellectual 
distortion in situations where there might otherwise be clear expressions of reality."). 
" Emphasis on "audience" can be found in a variety of works, including those that 
emphasize the "formulaic" style or "rhetorical" approaches. See, e.g, NAGEL, supra note 
1, at 154-55 (arguing that the "formulaic" style tends to make the Court's work inacces-
sible to a public audience); JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION at xiv, 11 
(1990) (arguing that the law is a "branch of rhetoric" and, as a "professional dis-
course," has a "specialized audience" that shapes that rhetoric); see also Sanford 
Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial opinion, in LAW'S STORIES 187, 199-200 (Peter 
Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (arguing that Supreme Court Justices expect their 
opinions "to be read by multiple audiences"). 
"" The phrase is Joseph Goldstein's in his book of the same title. See JOSEPH 
GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION (1992); see also Burke Marshall, Foreword 
to THE INTElliGIBLE CONSTITUTION supra, at xvii ("Familiarity with the Court's work 
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that modern doctrine bears the shopworn look of doctrine-by-order. 
But there is something less than satisfYing about the claim that the 
"people are being left out" if we are trying to identifY a distinctively 
modern doctrine. 39 Mter all, would the average man on the street in 
1935 have been any less bewildered when confronted with the idea of 
the "police power" than would a woman on the street in 1997 asked 
about the Edwards-Rnberson standard?40 Again, we find ourselves 
making arguments that sound very much like the realists' derisive 
claims about "lawyers' language."41 
Finally, there are those who have chosen, quite rightly, to view 
doctrine with an emphasis on rhetorical understandings. 42 Although 
this work is often illuminating, it is quite diverse, borrowing from a 
variety of traditions.43 Thus we learn that doctrine is constructed 
overwhelmingly demonstrates at a minimum that the members of the Court view their 
work as directed at the elite, and not to the people."). 
•• I tend to agree with Professor Goldstein that we might have a better 
constitutional grammar if in fact the "people" felt as if they could participate in 
constitutional arguments, see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 38, at 6 ("If Ours is to be an 
'intelligent democracy,' if Our revolutions are to be peaceful, We the People ... must 
be able to learn, from Our own reading of the Constitution and the Supreme Court's 
construction of it, what rights We have and do not have .... "), but I am not persuaded 
that modern doctrine is any more inaccessible to the masses today than in earlier days 
or that, if it were, that would tell us much about why we create the doctrine that we do. 
See Schauer, supra note I, at I463 (noting that "ordinary people simply do not read 
judicial opinions"). 
40 Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 4I2 (1990) (discussing Edwards-Roberson lim-
itations, which limit police authority to interrogate a suspect once she has invoked the 
right to counsel). 
41 See FRANK, supra note 36, at 22-24 (using the layman's derisive attitude toward 
"lawyers' language" as part of his realist critique). 
42 I use "rhetorical understandings" here to encompass not only an aesthetic-as 
would a "style"-but also to encompass "reasoning" processes aimed at persuasion, 
whether that persuasion is defined politically or as a reflection of reason. See, e.g., J.M. 
Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendentjustice, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1131, 118I 
(1994) (discussing rhetoric as a form of"persuasive advocacy"); Posner, supra note I, 
at I422 (distinguishing rhetoric from style because rhetoric connotes a reasoning 
process aimed at persuasion). 
" The diversity in the approaches is apparent from even a short list of those 
exploring law's rhetoric. See e.g., J.M. Balkin, A Night in the Topics: The Reason of Legal 
Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of Legal Reason, in LAw's STORIES, supra note 37, at 211, 2I6-18 
(equating the semiotician's point that law consists of "standard pro and con 
responses" for every legal argument with the idea of "topics" in classical rhetoric); 
Lawrence Douglas, Constitutional Discourse and Its Discontents: An Essay on the Rhetoric of 
judicial Review, in THE RHETORIC OF LAW 225, 227 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns 
eds., 1994) (arguing that constitutional interpretation reflects a rhetoric "of 
legitimation," in which "instabilities" of interpretation are "ceaselessly concealed and 
revealed, displaced and declaimed"); Reva B. Siegel, In the Eyes of the Law: Reflections on 
the Authority of Legal Discourse, in LAW'S STORIES, supra note 37, at 225, 226 (exploring 
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rather than given, malleable and obscuring rather than fixed and 
transparent, but we uncover few clues about why particular doctrines 
emerge, gain currency, and die. 44 For example, in his essay The Law 
Wishes to Have a Formal Existence, Stanley Fish embraces doctrine's 
formal ingenuity, celebrating rather than decrying the ways in which 
law aspires to an autonomous existence distinct from morality or 
science.45 Rejecting the despairing conclusions of much critical 
scholarship, Fish argues that doctrine's failings and inconsistencies 
"enable[] law to work."46 Ultimately, however, this welcome 
contrarianism avoids the question I am trying to answer about the 
choice of particular doctrinal forms. At the end of the essay, Fish 
himself recognizes this, telling us that he has not "chart[ed] in any 
detail any of the differently contingent courses the law has taken in 
the areas it has marked out for its own."47 Thus, although his analysis 
may provide clues about doctrinal formulation at an abstract level, it 
avoids the particulars. In doing so, it leaves us wondering whether 
Fish's critique is simply an updated celebratory version of the old 
claim that law reflects the social and moral predilections of its 
authors, dressed up in fancy vocabularies.48 
B. Caveats 
Before I go any further, a few caveats are in order. Taking 
doctrine seriously poses several hazards of misunderstanding.49 To 
rhetoric as the assertion of authority, the constituting of "our social universe through 
the language of the law" in the context of status discourse); see also James Boyd White, 
Law as Rheturic, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 684, 690-92 (1985) (emphasizing the ways in which legal language is a 
"constitutive rhetoric" creating a specific vision of"community"). 
" There are important exceptions, of course. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of 
Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2117-21 (1996) 
(showing the "preseiVation through transformation" of a status regime in the history 
of doctrinal rules governing violence against women). 
45 See STANLEY FISH, The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence, in THERE'S NO SUCH 
THINGASFREESPEECHANDIT'SAGOODTHING, TOO 141 (1994). 
46 /d. at 169. 
47 /d. at 178. 
48 See id. at 156 ("That is to say-and in so saying I rehearse the essence of my 
argument-the law is continually creating and recreating itself out of the very 
materials and forces it is obliged, by the very desire to be law, to push away."). 
49 One need only look at the pages of the leading law reviews to see evidence of 
"theory-orthodoxy." A LEXIS search for all articles published in the last decade that 
have the word "theory" in the title is incapable of completion because the search yields 
more than 1,000 documents. 
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many in the academy, doctrine is an undifferentiated mass of rules 
similar in concept and uninteresting in detail. For them, the 
interesting question is, why formalism? 50 On the opposite side of this 
divide sit practitioners and judges whose job descriptions compel 
them to focus on the question of "which" doctrine applies. 51 In this 
Article, I ask a different question: why this doctrine as opposed to 
another? This assumes, of course, that doctrines have histories, that 
they emerge, gain currency, and may die. Although difficult to prove, 
this statement resonates with most lawyers' and academics' daily use 
and understanding of doctrine.52 It is also consistent with our 
understandings of law and language in general. Imagine, for 
example, that we could magically resurrect Justice Holmes and set 
him down with volume 483 of the United States Reports. We can be 
fairly sure that, as he flipped the pages, his brow might furrow upon 
50 The debate on such issues is so widely dispersed as to defy a footnote. However, 
for some interesting approaches, highlighting the differing uses of the term formalism, 
see Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REv. 1, 8 (1983) ("A legal 
system is formal to the extent that its outcomes are dictated by demonstrative 
(rationally compelling) reasoning."); MichaelS. Moore, The Semantics of judging, 54 S. 
CAL. L. REv. 151, 154 (1981) ("Formalism is essentially a theory of adjudication."); 
Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the 
Constitution, 37 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 179, 181 (1986) ("Formalism enables a 
commentator to pronounce the outcome of the case as being correct or incorrect, in 
approximately the same way that the solution to a mathematical problem can be 
pronounced correct or incorrect."); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE LJ. 509, 
510 (1988) ("At the heart of the word 'formalism,' in many of its numerous uses, lies 
the concept of decisionmaking according to rule."); and Ernest J. Weinrib, The 
jurisprudence of Legal Formalism, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 583, 583 (1993) 
("Formalism is a theory of legal justification."). 
51 On the growing distance between academia and the bar, see Harry T. Edwards, 
The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 
34, 34-42 (1992) (bemoaning this growing distance). But see Richard A. Posner, The 
Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1921, 1921-28 
(1993) (disagreeing with Edwards's views about contemporary legal scholarship). 
52 Scholars working from widely different positions have acknowledged the 
temporal dimensions of our categories, doctrinal and otherwise. See, e.g., Charles 
Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1140, 1152 (1994) ("[T]here are the 
rhythms and sequences by which doctrine ... is brought into being, elaborated, 
modified, and perhaps eventually abandoned."); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal 
Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 98 (1984) ("[T]he most elementary categories that 
people use to organize everyday life, are culturally and historically contingent; that is, 
they are specific to given places and times."); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of 
Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 215-16 (1979) ("Categorical schemes 
have a life of their own."). 
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encountering "quasi-suspect classes,"53 "Witherspoon-excludable"54 
jurors, and the "effects prong of the Lemon test."55 He might ask what 
happened to the "police power,"56 "vested rights,"57 or "class 
legislation."58 Surely, however, he would recognize that law's working 
vocabulary, its language, and perhaps even its grammar, had 
changed. 
" See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (noting the Court's earlier 
rejection in Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986), of the notion that close relatives 
should be treated as a quasi-suspect class). 
" See, e.g., Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 407 n.6, 415 ( 1987) (referring to 
jurors properly excluded under guidelines set out in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 
(1968)). 
55 See, e.g., Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 347 (1987) (O'Connor,]., concurring in 
judgment) (disagreeing with the Court's interpretation of the '"effects' prong of the 
Lemon test"). 
56 By the end of the nineteenth century, the "police power had become the 
standard legal category for talking about the state's regulatory power over the health, 
safety, and morals of its citizens." HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 27. For an overview of the 
development of the concept of the police power during the nineteenth century and 
up until 1934, see PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DECISIONMAKING 153-73, 285-300 (3d ed. 1992). For an in-depth analysis of the 
"police power" with a revisionist bent, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION 
BESIEGED 61-146 (1993) (focusing on the Court's concern with "class" legislation in its 
police power decisions). 
57 During the first century of its development, "the core of general constitutional 
law was the vested rights doctrine." BREST & LEVINSON, supra note 56, at 105-09, 291; 
see also Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 305, 316-17 ( 1988) (discussing the concept of "vested rights"). 
58 
"Class legislation" was a term of art used in late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-
century opinions to refer to legislation that sought "to favor special interests at the 
expense of the public interest." HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 23; see GILLMAN, supra note 
56, at 61-99 (redescribing pre-Lochnerequal protection decisions in terms of the "class 
legislation" principle); see also, e.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885) (stating 
that "class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited" 
by the Fourteenth Amendment); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883) ("What 
is called class legislation ... would be obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment."). The idea of class legislation was incorporated into the basic standard 
governing the police power. See, e.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894) 
(noting that to justify the exercise of the police power, "it must appear ... that the 
interest~ of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, 
require such interference"). Such legislation was also deemed "partial." See, e.g., 
Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28-29 (1889) (noting that the 
Fourteenth Amendment "does undoubtedly prohibit discriminating and partial 
legislation by any State"). This principle appeared in constitutional law treatises as a 
viable category of constitutional law until at least 1929. 
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Once we accept the notion that constitutional rhetoric has 
changed, it seems only right to consider why this might be so.59 
Doctrine's sheer "ubiquity" has made its study difficult, but 
"underscores the need for a theory of its operation," as Professors 
Rubin and Feeley recently have suggested.60 At least in constitutional 
law, most have come to accept Philip Bobbitt's insight that there are 
different "forms" of argument and that "doctrinal argument" is one of 
those forms. 61 A number of questions remain, however, about the 
ever-changing appearance of such arguments. 
In what follows, I offer three case studies, intended less as the 
final word on doctrinal creation than as illuminating excerpts from a 
complex constitutional history. I proceed much the way an 
anthropologist or historian might-as if the entire doctrinal culture 
were strange to me, employing the device of a "foreign observer" to 
aid the investigation. 62 In this world, the received wisdom about 
doctrine has disappeared and we are free to ask whether it might have 
been different. This stance helps to isolate the act of doctrinal 
creation from the substantive merits of the controversy, and at the 
same time allows the study of doctrinal formulations at work. I leave 
the world of "big" theory for one of "thick" description, of "local" 
knowledge of a doctrinal practice. 63 
59 Even those scholars committed to the idea that doctrinal argument is "political" 
have their own stories about the history of doctrine. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 52, at 
116-25 (defending the historical study from a critical perspective). 
•• Rubin & Feeley, supra note 14, at 1990. 
61 PHILIP BOBBITI, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 39-58 (1982) (describing and analyzing 
the doctrinal form of argument). But see].M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional 
Grammar, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1771, 1778 (1994) (acknowledging Bobbitt's grammar, but 
rejecting his distinction between "legitimacy and justification" as applied to that gram-
mar). 
•• This approach is not standard doctrinal criticism, but neither is it 
unprecedented. See WILLIAM TwiNING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 
250 (1973) (discussing Llewellyn's "claim[] that he read his samples of opinions in 
much the same way" that historians read historical documents). 
•• The terms "thick" and "local" are terms borrowed from anthropology which 
have found homes in legal scholarship as well. See, e.g., FISH, supra note 45, at 171 ("A 
rhetorical jurisprudence does not ask timeless questions; it inquiries [sic] into the 
local conditions of persuasion, into the reasons that work .... "). On "local" knowledge 
as used in anthropology, see CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FuRTHER ESSAYS 
IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 215 (1983) ("Law ... is local knowledge, local not 
just as to place, time, class, and variety of issue, but as to accent-vernacular 
characterizations of what happens connected to vernacular imaginings of what can."). 
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II. THE SEARCH FOR "CLEAR LAw" 
If one is doubtful that modern constitutional doctrine has 
changed, one only has to look at the increasing incidence and 
importance of doctrinal rules that depend unashamedly upon the 
concept of legal "clarity" itself. It is no exaggeration to say that the 
Supreme Court has created so many doctrines requiring an inquiry 
about whether a right or power is "clear" or "unclear" that 
"commentators can [hardly] keep track of them. "64 Today, "clear law" 
presents a threshold question in every constitutional tort case,65 many 
habeas corpus petitions,66 and some exclusionary rule claims.67 A 
similar emphasis on legal clarity now governs Tenth Amendment 
68 69 II cases, Eleventh Amendment cases, as we as statutory 
interpretation70 and administrative law cases.71 If, like the realists, we 
64 John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Ckar Statement 
Rules, 1995 WIS. L. REv. 771, 771 (referring to "clear statement rules" in a variety of 
contexts); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel]. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, 
and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1991) (tracking a similar 
development of "clear law" rules in the context of constitutional remedies); Linda 
Ross Meyer, When Reasonable Minds Differ, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1467 (1996) (analyzing 
clear law developments in qualified immunity and other contexts). 
65 See, e.g., Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 515 (1994) (applying clear law standard 
to§ 1983 claim against state official); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) 
(holding that Bivens actions against federal officials are governed by the clear law 
standard). 
66 See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305-06 (1989) (stating that habeas 
petitioners may not rest claims upon "new rules"); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 
414 (1990) (interpreting Teague as saying that the "'new rule' principle ... validates 
reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts 
even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions"). 
" See, e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355 (1987) ("Nor can a law enforcement 
officer be said to have acted in good-faith reliance upon a statue if its provisions are 
such that a reasonable officer should have known that the statute was unconstitu-
tional."). 
•• See, e.g., Gregoryv. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,464 (1991) ("Application ofthe plain 
statement rule thus may avoid a potential constitutional problem."). 
69 See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775,786 (1991) (stating 
that the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity "can only be exercised by 
a clear legislative statement"); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) ("Lest 
Atascadero be thought to contain any ambiguity, we reaffirm today that in this area of 
the law, evidence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual."). 
70 See, e.g., Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 374 (1994) (announcing that 
the Court's task is "to determine whether the language the legislators actually enacted 
has a plain, unambiguous meaning"). 
71 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984) (stating that an administrative agency may enforce a rule that 
is a "reasonable" interpretation of a statute even if a court would find that interpreta-
tion to be incorrect). 
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are to define formalism as the false aspiration to doctrinal clarity and 
certainty,72 it seems difficult to deny that the increasing incidence of 
these rules reflects a new formality. One searches in vain for an 
example of a doctrinal rule created before 1945 in which the certainty 
and clarity of law itself played such an important and unabashed 
doctrinal role. 
A. The Meaning of "Clear Law" 
A foreign observer, aware of just a small amount of legal history, 
might become quite perplexed as she came upon these doctrines. 
She would note that, for much of the century, scholars and lawyers 
had challenged the idea that there was anything remotely like "clear 
law." Indeed, at the beginning of this century, the realists warned of 
the futility of "[c]ertainty-hunger and other superstitio[ns]."73 And 
yet, as we approach the year 2000, we find doctrine dripping off the 
pages of the federal reporters seeking "clearly established law,"74 
"unequivocally express[ed] intent,"75 and, of course, "plain 
meaning."76 How could it be, in an age where some have come to 
believe that we are "all realists,"77 that doctrine should hunger so 
openly for "clear law"? 
A native speaker of constitutional law would point the puzzled 
observer to cases such as Harlow v. Fitzgerald,18 a constitutional tort 
action decided at the beginning of the 1980s. Harlow stands at the 
72 FRANK, supra note 36, at 3-13, 18 (decrying the "basic legal myth" of legal clarity 
as a "childish" and "unrealistic notion that law is, or can be made, entirely certain and 
definitely predictable"). 
73 ld. at 87; see Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 
35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 812 (1935) (despairing that the law's language is "entirely 
useless" when it comes to actual prediction oflegal phenomenon). 
" See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (limiting liability for 
constitutional torts to conduct that "violate[s] clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known"). 
75 See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (holding 
that Congress waives Eleventh Amendment immunity only in cases where its intent to 
do so is "unequivocally express[ed]"). 
76 See, e.g., Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 374 (1994) (announcing that 
the Court's task is "to determine whether the language the legislators actually enacted 
has a plain, unambiguous meaning"). 
77 Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1151, 1152 (1985) 
("[T]he received learning has been that legal analysis cannot be neutral and determi-
nate, that general propositions of law cannot decide particular cases.");Joseph William 
Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REv. 467, 467 (1988) (reviewing KALMAN, supra 
note 6) ("We are all legal realists now."). 
78 457 u.s. 800 (1982). 
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end of a long line of cases establishing that federal and state officials 
are immune from damage liability for constitutional violations if they 
can show that their conduct was undertaken in good faith. 79 The 
Harlow Court, nervous about the increasing use of the tort remedy, 
focused on the subjectivity of the inquiry demanded by a rule based 
on "good faith," and decided to solve the problem by adopting a 
'llore stringent standard. Good faith, the Court announced, was not 
to be measured by the defendant's malice or intention, but by an 
objective standard based on "clearly established law."80 
Henceforward, government officials would be "shielded from liability 
for civil damages insofar as their conduct [did] not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights."81 
Had the clear law rule stopped with Harlow, few might have taken 
note. But, within the next decade and a half, the clear law rhetoric 
would emerge far afield from its origins. From constitutional torts, 
the clear law language moved to the exclusionary rule. In Illinois v. 
Krull, the Court held that illegally obtained evidence would not be 
excluded at trial if the statute authorizing the seizure was not clearly 
unconstitutional,82 analogizing a constitutional ambiguity to the kind 
of good-faith search affirmed by the Court in United States v. Leon.83 
From the exclusionary rule, the clear law rule moved to a new 
remedial field-habeas corpus. In the celebrated 1989 decision of 
Teag;ue v. Lane, the Supreme Court barred habeas petitions based on 
"new rules,"84 a phrase later defined by the Court, in Butler v. 
McKellar,85 as the set of rules upon which state judges could in good 
faith rely, again invoking Leon. Mter Butler, the price of a habeas 
79 See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) ("We hold that the defense of 
good faith and probable cause, which the Court of Appeals found available to the 
officers in the common-law action for false arrest and imprisonment, is also available 
to them in the action under § 1983. "). 
80 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18. 
81 I d. at 818. 
82 480 U.S. 340, 355-60 (1987) (applying the "good faith" exception created by 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and holding that, even if a statute 
authorizing warrantless administrative searches was unconstitutional, a police officer's 
good-faith reliance on that statute would bar application of the exclusionary rule); see 
also id. at 367 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Under the decision today ... courts are 
expected to determine at what point a reasonable officer should be held to know that 
a statute has, under evolving legal rules, become 'clearly' unconstitutional."). 
"' 468 U.S. 897, 924 (1984) (creating a good-faith exception to the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule). 
84 489 u.s. 288, 310 (1989). 
85 494 u.s. 407, 414 (1990). 
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petition was legal clarity: If state judges might reasonably disagree 
about the appropriate legal ruling, the rule sought was deemed 
"new," and the petition would be denied.86 And, just last year, 
Congress embraced its own version of the clear law principle, 
declaring in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 that state judges' reasonable interpretations of "clearly 
established" constitutional law would not be subject to review in a 
habeas application.87 
The rule of clear law seems to offer lawyers and judges a simple 
equation: Find unclarity in the law and you have solved the case-or 
at least a very large part of it. Judges may dismiss the constitutional 
tort claim, find the state official immune from suit, or deny a habeas 
petition as long as the court finds the law "unclear." In practice, 
however, this simple equation has proven extremely difficult to apply. 
The questions are obvious, yet perplexing. How clear must clear be? 
Is a rule clear if the principle it announces is clear, even though 
application to particular facts may be uncertain? What counts as law 
for the purposes of determining clear or unclear law? In the 
remedial context,88 these questions quickly multiply. Do conflicts in 
another circuit or between a circuit court and a district court count? 
What if the conflicting decisions are unpublished?89 Is "the case" its 
holding, its facts, or its announced rule?90 As the Supreme Court has 
86 In his Butlerdissent,Justice Brennan summarized the connection between clear 
law and new rules. See id. at 417-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("A legal ruling sought by 
a federal habeas petitioner is now deemed 'new' as long as the correctness of the 
rule ... is 'susceptible to debate among reasonable minds.' Put another way, a state 
prisoner can secure habeas relief only by showing that the state court's rejection of the 
constitutional challenge was so clearly invalid under then-prevailing legal standards that 
the decision could not be defended by any reasonable jurist.'' (emphasis added) 
(footnote omitted)); see also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 64, at 1734-35, 1752 
(equating, for some purposes, Teague's "new rule" doctrine with the "clearly 
established" law doctrine of the qualified immunity cases). 
87 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1) (West Supp. 1997). 
" By this I refer to the clear law rules applicable in the context of constitutional 
torts, habeas, and some exclusionary rule claims. The courts' demand for a clear 
statement in Tenth Amendment and Eleventh Amendment cases focuses on the 
clarity of expression of legislatures, rather than courts, and thus invites questions 
about the collective meanings of other institutions. 
89 See, e.g., McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1555 n.28 (6th Cir. 1996) (arguing that 
unpublished decisions may be relied upon because they are likely to be 
uncontroversial and, therefore, create "no new precedent"). 
90 Several scholars have noted these difficulties. See, e.g., Karen M. Blum, Qualified 
Immunity: A User's Manua~ 26 IND. L. REV. 187, 199-205 (1993) (surveying courts' 
approaches to determining whether a right is "clearly established"); Fallon & Meltzer, 
supra note 64, at 1751-53 (noting problems of specificity and authority in determining 
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already recognized, if generality counts, all law may be clear; but, if 
specificity counts, then no law may be clear91 for these purposes. 
In its remedial contexts, the clear law rule invites questions 
ranging from the mundanely difficult to the metaphysical.92 There 
are questions of geography (do decisions in other circuits make the 
law clear?) ,93 questions of timing (do decisions unnoticed until after 
the fact make the law clear?) ,94 and questions of scope (how closely 
must a precedent fit with the facts to find it controllingly clear?).95 At 
this point, our foreign observer-unwedded to these decisions or 
their place in the constitutional order-might begin to wonder why 
judges are trying to answer these rather heady questions. Do judges 
really need to develop a metatheory of law, legal change, and legal 
rules to decide tort cases? If the Court's purpose in creating these 
rules was to limit the number of frivolous constitutional claims or to 
slow the pace of legal change,96 there seem far easier ways to achieve 
those ends. The Court might have created procedural barriers (a 
'"the state of the law"' required by clear law rules (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 800, 818 n.32 (1982))); Meyer, supra note 64, at 1505-11 (discussing the "level of 
generality" and the "multiple sovereigns" problems). 
"' See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) ("The operation of this 
[objective legal reasonableness] standard ... depends substantially upon the level of 
generality at which the relevant 'legal rule' is to be identified."); see also Meyer, supra 
note 64, at 1507-10 (discussing the dilemma surrounding "levels of generality" as 
addressed by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits in two recent conflicting holdings). 
92 On the difficulty of the jurisprudential questions raised, see generally Fallon & 
Meltzer, supra note 64, at 1758 (noting that decisions about the clarity of legal change 
"raise profound issues of jurisprudential theory"), and Linda Meyer, "Nothing We Say 
Matters": Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 423,459-76 (1994) (discussing how 
Teague's new rule doctrine relies on theories of precedent, borrowed from the positive 
law and common law). 
"' See, e.g., Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1175-77 (6th 
Cir. 1988) (concluding that decisions of other circuits cannot establish "clear law" 
except in the extraordinary case). 
94 See, e.g., Martin v. Heideman, 106 F.3d 1308, 1313 (6th Cir. 1997) (acknowl-
edging that the court was applying a 1993 precedent to show that the law was clearly 
established in 1991, when the incident happened); see also Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 
510, 512-16 (1994) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit's position that precedent unnoticed by 
the district court was too late to be relevant to the "clear law" question). 
95 See, e.g., Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639 (acknowledging that most legal rights are 
"clearly established" at some level of generality and that plaintiffs could defeat the rule 
of qualified immunity simply by alleging violation of an abstract legal right); Martin, 
106 F.3d at 1312-13 (reversing the district court's determination that the law was 
unclear based on a series of opinions from various district and appellate courts by 
redescribing the right at a more general level-as the right to be free from excessive 
force rather than the right to be free from "excessively forceful handcuffing"). 
96 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 64, at 1793 n.327 (summarizing the frivolous 
claims argument); id. at 1798 n.355 (summarizing the law-freezing argument). 
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particularly stringent pleading rule, for example), or might simply 
have decided the constitutional questions. Mter all, the Court 
premised its embrace of clear law on the assumption that many of 
these claims were "insubstantial."97 If there are easier ways, then what 
does it mean that courts seem to be taking the harder path by trying 
to define legal clarity? And trying so hard in so very many places? 
B. justice as Clarity 
Our foreign observer might suggest, at this point, that the rule of 
clear law is peculiarly self-conscious: Doctrine itself has become an 
object of judicial study. Rather than asking the question, "What 
constitutional norms should decide this issue?", courts are required to 
ask, "How clearly did we describe the law in our past decisions?". In 
essence, this forces the judge's gaze on the behavior of legal 
institutions themselves; the parties to the dispute, as well as the 
factual and normative contest, recede in importance compared to the 
state of the doctrine. Perhaps more importantly, the rule reduces 
judicial behavior to the clarity of textual expression: The relevant 
question is, "How clearly did we say it?", not "What are the 
consequences of what we have said?". In this world, precedent is 
measured by whether it equivocates rather than whether it binds. 
Law becomes textual artifact rather than command. 
Could this self-conscious struggle have come from nowhere, 
descending without warning or design? The influences are no doubt 
various.98 But, at the same time, it seems difficult to believe that such 
97 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-14 (1982). In damage actions, the 
argument for a "clear law" standard has often been based on the notion that a 
"subjective" rule (based on the official's state of mind) would allow many non-
meritorious cases to proceed through discovery and trial because, on summary 
judgment, the plaintiff's complaint would raise an issue of fact based solely on the 
official's state of mind. See id. at 815-16. It does not follow, however, that non-
meritorious claims must proceed simply because of the mental state alleged. For 
example, a claim that an official maliciously searched the plaintiff's garbage can easily 
be dismissed without regard to the official's state of mind, because there is no consti-
tutional limitation on such searches. Only in a case where the mental state was 
essential to the constitutional claim would the case proceed. Then, however, we face 
the question of how the Court knows that these cases are, indeed, non meritorious ex 
ante, before there has been discovery or trial. 
98 In what follows, for example, I emphasize the realist critique of common law 
decisionmaking, although one can also see quite easily the influence of ideas 
associated with positivism and legal process. I make no claim of having found "the" 
scholarly source of modern constitutional doctrine, but only that doctrinal 
vocabularies reflect prevailing ideals of the judicial institution. But, even so, it is worth 
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a rule could have been created in an age confident of the common 
ideal of judging. No nineteenth-century court would have reached 
out to embrace the idea that law was uncertain; indeed, no 
nineteenth-century court would have conceived of its job in a way that 
would have permitted it to embrace such a rule. The common law 
model assumes that law transcends text,99 that it is seamless and is in 
this sense profoundly "unwritten. "100 In fact, the clear law rule 
assumes quite the opposite-that law is made rather than found, that 
it is textual rather than transcendent, that it is uncertain rather than 
seamless. And, in proceeding on these assumptions, it betrays a world 
in which the common law ideal of judging has come to be viewed with 
suspicion. 
The clear law rule takes a standard critique of the common law 
ideal of judging and transforms that critique into doctrine itself. 
Consider the charge, hailing back to Holmes and popularized by the 
realist movement, that law is merely the prediction of the "behavior" 
of judges. 101 There is no clearer (no pun intended) evidence of this 
noting that both positivism and legal process are not unrelated to realism and, indeed, 
may be seen as reactions to, or embodiments of, some tenets of realism. See Neil 
Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. 
REv. 601, 623 (1993) (discussing Lon Fuller's argument that realism is simply an 
example of positivism); Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of 
Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1393, 1396 (1996) 
(noting that the legal process model was an attempt to accommodate and respond to 
the realist critique). From such a perspective, it would not be surprising to see traces 
of legal process or positivism in the constitutional doctrine of the post-war era. 
99 See John Dickinson, The Law Behind Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 113, 117 (1929) 
("The theory of the common law ... insists that in cases of first impression the court 
must not be regarded as exercising an active legislative choice among a number of 
possible ... rules .... On the contrary, a body of rules is supposed to be already in 
existence which stands ready to decide all possible cases."). 
100 See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 156 (1988) 
("Text-based theories instruct a court to start with doctrinal propositions promulgated 
in past texts by officials [and to] ... work backward down a chain of authorization to 
determine whether the propositions are valid, and if they are, apply them to cases. 
This is not how courts determine the content of the common law."); GERALD J. 
POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 14-29 (1986) (discussing 
common law theory as law based on custom which "defined its conception of law in 
sharp contrast with written or enacted law, 'lex scripta"'). 
101 See WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFUCT 
OF LAws 29 (1942) ("As practicing lawyers we are interested in knowing how certain 
officials of society-judges, legislators, and others-have behaved in the past, in order 
that we may make a prediction of their probable behavior in the future." (emphasis 
added)); FRANK, supra note 36, at 4 7 (stating that law is "in fact prophecies or predic-
tions ofjudicial action" and that "[i]t is from this point of view that the practice of law 
has been aptly termed an act of prediction" (footnote omitted)); Underhill Moore & 
Theodore S. Hope, Jr., An Institutional Approach to the Law of Commercial Banking, 38 
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kind of behaviorism than the clear law rule. When judges apply the 
rule, they do not treat prior opinions as commands but instead as 
judges' "behavior"-what judges have said in the past. In effect, 
judges acknowledge the power of prior precedent, but alienate 
themselves from it, distancing themselves from their own authority. 102 
Indeed, the clear law rule is the very embodiment of the idea that law 
is a matter of prediction as applied to doctrine itself As the Supreme Court 
put it in Teag;ue v. Lane, a law that fails to predict (to clearly "dictate" 
an outcome) may not be governing constitutional law at all. 103 
Perhaps more importantly, consider how the clear law rule has 
absorbed the classic critique that courts "make" law rather than "find" 
it in some transcendent universe. 104 There is no more obvious case of 
courts treating their own doctrine as "made" than the clear law rule. 
Clear law rules ask courts to find the "plain meaning" of their prior 
precedent. Courts put themselves in the position typically reserved 
for legislatures, asking statutory interpretation questions of themselves. 
Remember all of the difficulties that the clear law rule posed: about 
the interpretation of prior precedents, about whether the courts were 
a single collective entity, and about what level of specificity could be 
used to describe the claim. 105 Now compare these difficulties--of 
textual ambiguity, collective meaning, and levels of generality-to our 
debates about statutory interpretation. The only difference here is 
that courts must ask these questions of cases and judicial history, 
YALE LJ. 703, 703 (1929) ("The central problem of the lawyer is the prediction of 
judicial and administrative decisions of government officers." (emphasis added)). 
These can be traced back, of course, to the famous Holmesian statement that "[t]he 
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I 
mean by the law." O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897). 
102 When applying the clear law rule, courts defer to statements of law found in 
other opinions to determine the level of clarity with which a particular proposition is 
stated. This leads to a kind of legal self-alienation, which Linda Meyer aptly has 
described as "nothing we say matters." Meyer, supra note 92. 
10
' 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("[A] case announces a new rule if 
the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction 
became final."). 
104 See FRANK, supra note 36, at 128 ("[W]henever a judge decides a case he is 
making law." (emphasis omitted)); id. at 36-37 (explaining that the denial of "judicial 
law-making" is judicial "self-deception"); id. at 121 ("The power [of judges] to 
individualize and to legislate judicially is of the very essence of their function."); 
LLEWELLYN, supra note 27, at 66 ("[T]he way to deal with a [legal] situation is to look 
at the situation and its needs, and if no appropriate concept is available, then to make 
one."). 
105 See supra text accompanying notes 89-95. 
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rather than statutes and legislative history. 106 The clear law rules 
demand not, as Judge Calabresi once put it, a common law for an 
"age of statutes,"107 but rules of statutory interpretation for virtual 
legislation. 
My point is not that doctrine has in fact adopted common law 
critiques or become more realistic. 108 It is that the clear law rule is not 
only a rule, it is a job description. When courts create a doctrine that 
requires them to find the "plain meaning" of their prior texts, they 
describe themselves in ways that betray a particular self-image, an 
image that departs significantly from the common law ideal. Treating 
opinions as what they say, rather than what they command, creating a 
rule that requires courts openly to acknowledge, and find, "unclear" 
rather than transparent law, and making doctrine depend upon 
shifting, rather than permanent, linguistic traditions are all signs of a 
court that views its job in terms that no nineteenth-century judge 
could ever understand. 
If the clear law rule assumes a judicial role far different from the 
common law ideal, it also suggests a sensitivity to judicial criticism 
that is peculiarly modern. Indeed, in a strange sense, the rule of clear 
law seems almost the embodiment of Jerome Frank's injunction that 
the law analyze itself, that it become "self-conscious" of its own status 
in the legal world. 109 Once upon a time, the notions that law was 
uncertain, nothing more than a prediction of the behavior of lawyers, 
106 Clear law cases raise, for example, questions about the meaning of a prior 
precedent when judges disagree. See, e.g., Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Seiter, 
858 F.2d 1171, 1175-76 (6th Cir. 1988) (considering questions about the meaning of 
judicial intent when there are conflicting out-of-circuit opinions). Such cases even 
raise questions about whether certain kinds of '1udicial history" (for example, 
unpublished opinions or post-hoc decisions) should count. See, e.g., Martin v. 
Heideman, 106 F.3d 1308, 1312-13 (6th Cir. 1997) (considering post-hoc judicial 
history-using a case decided in 1993 to determine clear law in 1991); McCloud v. 
Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1555 & n.28 (6th Cir. 1996) (considering the question of whether 
judicial history that amounts to "unpublished" material should be considered in 
determining clear law). 
107 GUIDO CALAIIRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). 
108 See infra text accompanying notes 111-12. 
109 Of course, Frank intended that this self-analysis would lead judges to reveal 
their social and political motivations. See FRANK, supra note 36, at 114-15 ("What we 
may hope some day to get from our judges are detailed autobiographies ... or 
opinions annotated ... with elaborate explorations of the background factors in 
[their] personal experience which swayed [them] in reaching [their] conclusions."). 
The clear law rule, by contrast, applies this autobiographical injunction to the law 
itself, giving us doctrinal, rather than judicial, autobiography. This, in turn, yields an 
odd reversal: Rather than a truly realist exposition of a judge's motivations, doctrine 
that is self-conscious provides an autobiography of itself. 
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and a matter of "judicial legislation," were considered trenchant 
criticisms of judicial aspirations. Today, doctrines like the clear law 
rule reflect some version of these criticisms. 
The most important point to see here, however, is that all of this 
effort to absorb criticism turns out, in the end, to preserve a space 
where law stands safe from critique. Indeed, one of the most 
fascinating aspects of the clear law rule is how it both reflects 
institutional doubt at the same time that it cabins it. A doctrine that 
truly sought to absorb the indeterminacy critique would be a blank 
canvas. By contrast, a doctrine that looks for "clear law" leaves room 
for the possibility of law that is truly clear and may be found. The 
beauty of doctrinalizing the institutional critique is that it gives hard 
edges: outside the edges the law is unclear, but, inside, it is as clear as 
it can be. Using traditional technique-the creation of bounded 
categories--doctrine has managed both to bow to judicial critics and, 
at the same time, to sustain faith in judicial legitimacy. It has simply 
incorporated this battle into the lines it asks courts to draw between 
"clear" and "unclear" law. 
To see that there is a price to be paid for incorporating this battle 
within doctrine, however, it is important to understand how litigants 
may find themselves bearing the burden of the fight. The stated aim 
of many clear law rules is to give notice to government officials that 
their actions are constitutionally impermissible. 110 But the doctrine 
has not been applied this way; when a court looks to determine 
whether the law is unclear, it does not ask whether the law would be 
unclear to a layman. Instead, it applies standards of certainty that 
only a lawyer, indeed, only a judge, could know or apply. When the 
constitutional tort suit against the building manager is dismissed 
because the law is unclear, the standard is not the unclarity to the 
building manager, but the unclarity to judges. 111 What average 
110 One of the principal arguments for such rules is that they refuse to apply 
impossible standards of legal acumen to ordinary government officials. See Fallon & 
Meltzer, supra note 64, at 1791 (noting the unfairness of imposing liability on govern-
ment officials who have "reasonably relied on authoritative pronouncements of consti-
tutional law"); Meyer, supra note 64, at 1503 (arguing that the focus in qualified 
immunity cases is "fair notice to governmental officials"). The irony, of course, is that, 
as applied, the rules measure uncertainty by the uncertainty of lawyers, not laymen. 
111 Lest this appear an unlikely example, I litigated just such a case in the Fifth 
Circuit on behalf of the Justice Department, representing a low-level federal building 
manager who was sued for violating the plaintiff's First Amendment rights. (The 
plaintiff sought to pass out a mock FBI "Wanted" poster of Ronald Reagan that the 
manager believed deceptively resembled a real FBI poster.) The case was insubstantial 
because the plaintiff suffered no damage; the leaflets were distributed. Litigating the 
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government employee do you know who understands that he may 
ignore a district court in the city next door because, after all, it is in a 
different circuit?112 Or that he could be bound by an opinion that was 
officially "unpublished" or decided after the events in question? Even 
in habeas cases, where the government officials involved are state 
judges, the inquiry is not about the "lived" uncertainty of the judges 
who decided the original appeal, but an abstract, ungrounded 
question of whether precedent would have "dictated" a different 
outcome.m 
In a sense, the rule of clear law measures the justice of real-life 
claims by law's own sense of uncertainty. Herein lies the danger of a 
modernist, inward-looking rhetoric. It is not that the people are "left 
out" of the Court's opinions or that the resulting style is too 
formulaic. It is that an institution that asks doctrine to answer 
difficult questions about law and legal clarity may indulge its own 
institutional insecurities at the expense of the litigants. In classical 
architecture, the Ionic column that is perfectly rendered may inspire 
our contemplation and admiration, but, if it cannot bear weight, it 
will leave a building in collapse. So, too, a rule which focuses on 
courts' own institutional self-image may leave litigants with little to 
stand upon. There are real institutional choices to be made in these 
cases, but the rule of clear law does not help us make those choices. 114 
The doctrine keeps us focused on the "clarity" of the court's own 
texts. And, in so doing, it asks litigants to bear the costs of the court's 
own self-consciousness-costs that must be measured not only in the 
clear law issues, however, raised some difficult questions about the "clarity" of the law 
and how specifically one should describe the "right" at issue (was it the right to free 
speech, the right to pass out leaflets in a public building, or, as the manager claimed, 
the right to pass out leaflets that were misleadingly like FBI Wanted Posters?). Perhaps 
this explains why the appellate court simply reversed without opinion. See Foster v. 
Bowen, 866 F.2d 1419 (1989). 
112 Although some courts seem to have recognized this difficulty, they have resisted 
its implications for all cases. See, e.g., Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Seiter, 858 
F.2d 1171, 1175-76 (6th Cir. 1988) (expressing doubt that out-of-circuit decisions can 
make law "clear," without acknowledging that the defendants were as unlikely to be 
aware of decisions within the circuit as without). 
m See, e.g., Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 409 (1990) ("We have held, however, 
that a new decision generally is not applicable in cases on collateral review unless the 
decision was dictated by precedent existing at the time the petitioner's conviction 
became final."). 
114 Indeed, it tends to obscure the choices by focusing on the court's image 
without considering the court's role vis-a-vis other institutions. See KOMESAR, supra 
note 21, at 6, 134-50 (describing how comparative institutional analysis would ask 
these questions). 
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time spent in answering questions about "what law counts" and "how 
clear is clear," but also in a legal system that purports to measure the 
justice of a claim against a government building manager by legal 
intricacies only judges and lawyers could know. 
Ill. INTERESTS AND EXPECTATIONS 
If the clear law rule seems outside the core of standard 
constitutional law concepts, let me expand the scope of the inquiry to 
more familiar territory. One cannot be a native speaker of modern 
constitutional law without being well-versed in a rather complex 
rhetoric of expectation and interest. 115 Indeed, the architecture of 
much standard constitutional law depends upon the notion that there 
are constitutional "interests" that can be identified and classified in 
various ways (as fundamental or compelling, as social or economic, or 
in other ways), and that these classifications tell us which 
"perspective" to take on the claim (whether to strictly scrutinize or 
defer) .116 The "rule of perspective" is my shorthand for a tendency to 
craft legal doctrine in a way that does not purport to direct conduct 
per se, but instead points the judging party to a certain imaginative 
position vis-a-vis the case, toward or against one party, for or against a 
particular argument. 
Interests and expectations are as ubiquitous in modern 
constitutional law as are the rules of perspective that enforce them. 117 
Indeed, rules of perspective have become a popular way of creating 
new constitutional doctrine. Thus, in criminal procedure, when 
asked to decide how to determine what qualifies as a "search," or 
115 Case books indoctrinate students quite openly in the language of metaconstitu-
tional law. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 561 (1996) 
("One therefore cannot understand the equal protection clause without first under-
standing the general methodology courts use to resolve equal protection disputes .... 
In recent years, the Court's approach has involved creation of various 'tiers' of 
review .... [C]Iassifications not drawn on a 'suspect basis' are subject to 'low-level' or 
'rational basis' review .... "). 
116 See id. at 842; jOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
§ 14.3, at 600-06 (5th ed. 1995). 
117 These concepts extend far beyond the area of individual rights with which they 
are typically associated. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 
662, 670-71 ( 1981) (requiring in a dormant commerce clause case a perspective that is 
"sensitive" to "the weight and nature of the state regulatory concern in light of the 
extent of the burden imposed on the course of interstate commerce"). 
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whether a person is "in custody" for purposes of applying Miranda, 118 
or the proper standard for a Terry stop,119 the Court reaches out to a 
rule of perspective; the Court tells the applier of the law that the 
search, custody, or stop depends upon the interests and perspective 
f bl . h . . 120 o a reasona e person m t e situation. 
Of course, rules of perspective can be traced to concepts as old as 
the republic, as can the concept of "interest" in constitutional law. 121 
Still, it is difficult to believe that we could simply replace the modern 
rhetoric of interest and perspective with the rhetoric of another time 
or place. Once upon a time, courts spoke of litigants' claims and 
arguments, not their interests or expectations, and they applied a rule 
of constitutional arbitrariness rather than a complex metataxonomy 
of constitutional scrutinies. 122 Lest we doubt the change, all we need 
to do is consider how older common law concepts such as "the police 
power" or "vested rights" might have looked had they emerged in an 
age of "interest and expectation." The police power might have been 
"a compelling police interest." "Vested rights" might have been those 
rights in which the complainant had an "expectation of security." To 
enunciate these rules is to embrace anachronism; it is to impose the 
ring of modern doctrine upon an older, largely forgotten, discourse. 
It is possible, of course, that nothing much hangs on how these 
rules are expressed-that it does not matter whether we use the term 
"interest" or "expectation" or whether the rule is framed in terms of a 
perspective. On the other hand, there are reasons to question why 
the shift seems so natural today. Many constitutional rules might 
have been stated in different ways. Rather than saying, for example, 
that privacy or security depended upon the "expectation" of the 
parties, the Court might simply have enumerated impermissible 
118 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 
420, 442 (1984) ("[T]he only relevant inquiry [in custody cases] is how a reasonable 
man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation."). 
119 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 
(1991) (defining "free to leave" as "whether a reasonable person would feel free to 
decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter"). 
120 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan,]., concurring) 
(defining a search for Fourth Amendment purposes in terms of a reasonable person's 
expectation of privacy). 
121 The Federalist Papers, for example, cannot be understood without a healthy 
appreciation of the meaning of the term "interest." See Victoria Nourse, Toward a ''Due 
Foundation" for the Separation of Powers: The Federalist Papers as Political Narrative, 74 
TEX. L. REv. 447,478-81 (1996). 
122 See infra note 138. 
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government intrusions. 123 Similarly, rather than developing a 
hierarchy of scrutinies, the Court might have stated that some 
reasons, such as race, are almost never a reason to disadvantage 
persons. That these rules might have been stated this way, however, 
does not explain why courts have clung to a different rhetoric. 
A. Perspective, Considered 
A foreign observer looking for help understanding the role of 
interest, expectation, and perspective in one of its more 
straightforward appearances might do well to start with Katz v. United 
States! 24 the quintessential modern criminal procedure decision. In 
Katz, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment barred 
warrantless government wiretaps to overhear conversations in a public 
telephone booth. 125 In so holding, the Court refused to limit the 
Fourth Amendment's protection to governmental trespass!26 instead 
concluding that a search depended upon an individual's "right to 
privacy."127 The doctrinal rule, taken from Justice Harlan's 
concurrence, was that a search was to be judged by the defendant's 
"expectation of privacy. "128 
Although it is difficult to see today, the Court need not have 
created a rule of perspective to decide Katz. Existing doctrine could 
not yield the result the Court chose: Rules of trespass left Mr. Katz's 
case uncovered, and deciding that a public telephone booth was a 
"constitutionally protected area"129 seemed constitutional hyperbole. 
On the other hand, there were alternatives. For example, the Court 
125 See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text (discussing different ways in 
which the Fourth Amendment search rule might have been formulated). 
1
" 389 u.s. 347 (1967). 
125 See id. at 353 ("The Government's activities in electronically listening to and 
recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied 
while using the telephone booth .... "). 
126 See id. ("We conclude that ... the 'trespass' doctrine ... can no longer be 
regarded as controlling."). 
127 See id. at 350-51 (contrasting the individual's right to privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment with a person's more general right to privacy governed by the states); see 
also id. at 353 ("The Government's activities ... violated the privacy upon which he 
justifiably relied .... "). 
128 See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("My understanding of the rule ... is that 
there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'"). 
129 See id. at 349-50 (noting that petitioner's questions were directed to whether a 
phone booth was a "constitutionally protected area"). 
1997] MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 1429 
might have ruled that the government must justify its use of 
technology to obtain information that the human senses cannot. 130 
Or, the Court might have expressed its ruling in terms of property-
that the government may not, without justification or consent, 
appropriate conversations of private citizens for public use. 151 Or it 
might have expressed the rule in terms of due process-that the 
government may not, without justification, profit from taking action 
which, if taken by private parties, would amount to a violation of 
I 1~2 aw. 
Each of these approaches differs rather distinctly from the rule 
adopted in Katz precisely because that rule is one of perspective. 
Rather than asserting substantive authority, such rules assert 
methodological authority: Courts are asked to decide by placing 
themselves in a particular position vis-a-vis the parties and their 
claims. Just as a rational basis rule tells judges to take a particular 
intellectual stance with respect to the government's justification, the 
Katz rule tells judges to take a particular intellectual stance with 
respect to defendants' expectations. This imaginative exercise, by 
which the court is asked to identify or distance itself from the litigants 
or their claims, is then tempered by a rule against self-interest: The 
defendant's perspective or the state's interest will be honored only if 
found "reasonable" or "legitimate." 
The great and well-known difficulty of Katz's rule is its tendency to 
dissolve into circularity. Shortly after Katz was decided, Professor 
Anthony Amsterdam demonstrated this quite easily. He simply asked 
us to consider the possibility that "the government could diminish 
each person's subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing 
half-hourly on television that ... we were all forthwith being placed 
under comprehensive electronic surveillance."133 Once everyone 
expects to be spied upon, individuals not only lose their "subjective" 
expectation of privacy, but risk the loss of their objective expectation 
130 See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (holding that the 
government must justify its use of tracking beepers when these electronic devices allow 
agents to monitor persons or property withdrawn from public view). 
131 See WHITE, supra note 37, at 143 (suggesting possible property-type arguments 
in the wiretapping context). 
132 This argument is derived from the famous principle enunciated by Justice 
Brandeis in Olmstead that "[i]f the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds 
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself." Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis,]., dissenting). 
'" Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 
349, 384 (1974). 
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as well: If everyone anticipates government surveillance, a contrary 
expectation may well seem unreasonable. As Amsterdam's 
hypothetical illustrates, if we change the world in ways that seem 
grossly unfair or dangerous, rules of perspective risk deference to that 
unfairness or dangerousness. 134 And they do so precisely because they 
purport to be rules of perspective-because they ask courts to reach a 
legal conclusion based on what are assumed to be the preexisting 
interests and expectations of the parties. 
The most fascinating aspect of this story is not how it ended, but 
that it has been repeated so often, despite persistent doubts that this 
doctrinal method can really deliver the "realism" or the '1ustice" that 
it promises. The "search" cases, for example, end up being decided 
based on whether the court declares the parties' expectations to be 
"reasonable," yielding results that often depart from what people say 
are their "real" expectations of privacy. 135 A similar phenomenon can 
be seen in other areas of constitutional law. Indeed, it is now 
conventional wisdom that the most important question in many 
constitutional cases is how the court should characterize a perspective 
or interest or right (as compelling or legitimate or fundamental), 136 a 
process that may or may not yield results consistent with public 
expectation. Not surprisingly, there is no ready correlation between 
rules of perspective and sound constitutional results. Korematsu's 
twentieth-century reference to the "most rigid scrutiny"137 has not 
saved it from constitutional disgrace any more than Yick Wo's reliance 
'" See Nourse, supra note 19, at 1374-80 (discussing an analogous process in the 
context of criminal law). 
"' Christopher Slobogin &Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy 
and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings &cognized 
and Permitted by Society", 42 DUKE LJ. 727, 737-42 (1993) (reporting results of an 
empirical study showing that the "expectations" rule in the Fourth Amendment 
context has yielded results distinctly different from people's "actual" expectations of 
privacy). 
136 See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. 
REv. 1, 8 (1972) (noting that the choice of a level of scrutiny often determines the 
outcome of a particular case); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf,Levels of Generality 
in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1057, 1065 (1990) (noting that 
"whether to designate a right as fundamental poses a central substantive question in 
modern constitutional law," a question that often depends upon "competing charac-
terizations of the level of generality" at which to describe the right in question). 
m Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
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on the ancient constitutional language of "arbitrariness" has hindered 
. . I . 138 
consutuuona pra1se. 
B. justice as Culture 
Given the difficulties, why have courts chosen to embrace 
constitutional perspectivism in such a vast array of forms and cases? If 
we imagine that doctrinal formulations reflect courts' image of 
themselves, the origins of these rules may become clearer. Think 
about it for a minute: redescribing the "police power" as a "police 
interest" jars the native speaker of constitutional law, not only because 
of linguistic habit, but also because it brings together two very 
different ideas of law and courts. A police "interest" suggests that the 
court's job is to describe and defer to what exists "out there" in the 
real world; a police "power" suggests quite a different judicial role-
that the court does not defer to, but commands, legal relationships, 
and that it does so without regard to real world analogues. Subtly 
perhaps, but nevertheless clearly, the rhetoric portrays an 
institutional image-one which pits a common law ideal of courts 
against a seemingly more "realistic" ideal, one in which courts aspire 
to arbitrate social interests rather than to master the established 
doctrinal order. 
This shifting ideal came, of course, from somewhere, and rules of 
perspective betray those influences. 139 It hardly seems a coincidence, 
for example, that judges of the post-war period would embrace 
doctrinal terms reflecting social "interests." Would it have been 
possible to graduate from law school in the 1940s and 1950s, as the 
judges of the 1970s and 1980s did, without learning that the Supreme 
Court had precipitated a constitutional crisis when it preferred 
concepts of property and contract to "social interest" and "situation-
1
"' Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 366, 367 (1886) (recounting the common 
nineteenth-century understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment barred the 
"arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty," and that the ordinance in question granted 
authority to the government that was "purely arbitrary''); see GILLMAN, supra note 56, at 
72 (arguing that the Court in Yick Wo concluded that the ordinances at issue were 
arbitrary because they were "based simply on favoritism or spite, and not on any 'good 
reason"' related to the general welfare). 
139 The image of judging as arbitration can be traced to the realist critique of the 
common law ideal. See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 36, at 157 ("The judge, at his best, is an 
arbitrator . ... [T] he arbitral function is the central fact in the administration of 
justice."). 
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sense"?140 Indeed, Dean Pound's sociological jurisprudence insisted 
that a vocabulary of social interests should replace common law 
concepts. 141 And, although the legal realists rejected Pound/42 they, 
too, decried the old, failed formalism because it did not reflect "the 
realities of ever-changing social, industrial and political conditions."14s 
With this history in mind, it is easier to see how rules of 
perspective reflect modern indictments of the common law ideal. 
What better way to make the law reflect social interests than to create 
doctrinal rules that depend quite openly on those interests? If the 
common law model focuses too heavily on the "ought" rather than 
the "is,"144 what better way to correct that error than by acknowledging 
that law is a matter of "perspective"?145 If the common law model 
failed to recognize that facts were more reliable than values, 146 then 
140 Llewellyn specifically recommended that the "forecasting" and "prediction" of 
the "ordinary lawyer" was better achieved when "situation-sense" helped to 
"reshap[e] ... the doctrinal materials used." LLEWELLYN, supra note 27, at I99. 
Llewellyn meant many things by "situation-sense," of course, variously defining it in his 
later years as "the facts of the situation taken as a type," id. at I22, and a "fact-pattern" 
that "carrie[d] within itself its appropriate, natural rules, its right law." /d. (quoting 
Levin Goldschmidt). 
141 See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 
27 HARV. L. REV. I95, 225-34 (19I4) (noting that "a movement is taking place palpably 
in the law of all countries today," emphasizing "social interest"); Roscoe Pound, A 
Suroey of Sociallnterests, 57 HARV. L. REV. I, I3 (I943) (originally published as A Theury 
of Social Interests, I5 PAPERS & PROC. AM. Soc. SoC'Y I6 (192I)) ("In general, but not 
always, it is expedient to put claims or demands in their most generalized form, i.e., as 
social interests, in order to compare them."). 
142 Llewellyn's famous article on realism seems both to praise Pound's "balancing 
of interests," and, at the same time, to ask "how" one "tell[s] an interest when you see 
one." Llewellyn, supra note 36, at 435 & n.3. 
145 FRANK, supra note 36, at 7; see Cohen, supra note 73, at 8I2 (criticizing opinion-
writing "apt to forget the social forces which mold the law and the social ideals by 
which the law is to be judged"); Horwitz, supra note I, at 209 ("[The r] ealists agreed 
that law needed to be brought back in touch with life, that legal categories needed to 
reflect better or express a more complex social reality."). 
144 HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 212 (noting the charge, made by Fuller, that the 
realists sought to make the "Ought acquiesce in the Is"). 
145 Normative "relativism" is a feature of some realist writing. See AMERICAN LEGAL 
REAuSM, supra note 6, at 169 ("One aspect of the Realists' outlook ... was their 
ambivalence concerning the origins and status of moral propositions. A few mem-
bers ... forthrightly adopted the stance of ethical relativism .... "). 
146 Early realist critiques were strongly influenced by the idea that facts and 
experience are more reliable than rules or values. See, e.g., AMERICAN LEGAL REAusM, 
supra note 6, at 166 (noting that many realists insisted "that, to be meaningful and 
useful, [legal] generalizations must be empirically based (derived from verifiable data) 
and narrow (incorporating only a small collection of manifestly similar situations or 
propositions)."). 
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what better way to cure this blindness than to focus courts on the job 
of describing real-life interests and expectations? 
A court that reaches out to embrace a doctrinal rule based on 
social expectations and interests announces not only a job 
description, but also a preferred legal method. A common law model 
proceeds by emphasis on backward-looking analogical reasoning. 147 
By contrast, a rule of perspective is decidedly forward-looking: It tells 
the reader how to attend to the decisionmaking process, to 
imaginatively identify with one of the parties or the arguments at 
issue. Didactic rather than authoritative, rules of perspective try to 
teach us how to intellectually attack the problem rather than to 
prescribe solutions. Summoning such directions appears to point the 
way to predict, enhancing the court's sense of its candor about 
decisionmaking. 148 Soon, the facts and holdings so important to the 
common law method recede in importance relative to questions 
about the proper level of scrutiny, the nature of the interest, or the 
character of the expectation. 149 Backward-looking analogy is placed in 
the service of the new emphasis on methodology. 15{) 
This account of critique being absorbed by doctrine tells only half 
the story, however. As we have seen before, incorporating such 
critiques within doctrine has a way of sustaining older ideals. The 
other half of this story, then, is how rules of interest and expectation 
end up cabining the critique. If law were only culture or perspective, 
of course, we would need no law at all. But bending perspective to 
doctrinal rule puts hard edges around the critique, leaving substantial 
room for the old-fashioned exercise of judicial authority and 
command. Just as the rule of unclear law leaves room for clear law, 
rules of interest and expectation leave room for something more than 
147 The common law focus on analogical reasoning was a favorite target of realist 
attack. See HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 205 (noting that realism had "drawn into 
question" the "process of analogy itself ... as fundamentally political," and that, for 
many realists, analogy was, in effect, "judicial legislation"). 
~<a This kind of candor was prized by realist critics of the common law model. See 
FRANK, supra note 36, at 12! ("To do their intricate job well our judges need all the 
clear consciousness of their purpose which they can summon to their aid."). 
149 Witness the Court's lengthy discussions of the proper "level of scrutiny." See, 
e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (discussing, in an equal protection case, 
the three levels of scrutiny and noting how the application turns on the classifications 
made). 
150 I do not mean to suggest by this that courts have given up analogical reasoning; 
they have not. Instead, analogical reasoning has been redirected from facts and 
statute toward methodology. See infra Part IV (discussing the creation of categories 
unified by methodology). 
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culture and perspective. The expectation is not the end of the case, 
the reasonable expectation is; scrutiny is not the finish, the level of 
scrutiny is. Courts still exercise normative authority, but simply do it 
in different rhetorical guises. They decide which expectations are 
reasonable or which interests are compelling or merely important. 
Embracing perspective as doctrine, then, means that there are some 
cases in which perspective does not count, where values are not 
relative, where courts may make "objective" judgments about 
reasonable expectations of privacy and compelling governmental 
interests. 
One might argue that all of this effort serves important purposes. 
Professor Schauer, for example, has argued that courts should self-
consciously emulate the making oflegislative rules. 151 Unlike others, I 
have no quarrel with courts borrowing concepts or formats that seem 
closer to the legislative rulemaking ideal. Form is not the issue: a 
three-part test may be the agent of terror as easily as a one-word 
command. The danger here is not in courts' recognition or 
emulation of legislative style, but that the courts' struggle for their 
own identities is a rhetorical diversion-that the rhetoric of self-
consciousness will eclipse, and subvert, the real decisions that need to 
be made. 
First, there is the danger that the rhetorical compromise between 
a law that defers and one that judges will be mistaken for one that has 
simply given up judging. Describing a "claim" as an "interest" 
grounds it in nature. Unlike a "claim," which is pure legal 
convention, an "interest" appears to exist in the world without regard 
to what the court does and will exist long after the court has come to 
its decision. This "naturalizing" of legal arguments in the world 
encourages deference to popular needs but risks indifference to the 
unpopular. A rule that encourages courts to believe that all they are 
doing is "describing" a world of interests and perspectives, if imposed 
on a world full of inequalities, will simply redescribe, and entrench, 
those inequalities within the law itself. 152 As R.M. Hare put it, 
"standards only remain current when those who make judgements in 
accordance with them are quite sure that, whatever else they may be 
151 Schauer, supra note 1, at 1470 (arguing that "it may be appropriate to think of 
opinion writing as (at least in part) a conscious process of rule making"). 
152 Even those sympathetic to the realist project have acknowledged this. See 
HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 211 (noting Fuller's criticism that "in attempting to have law 
simply mirror society, Realism ended up endowing the Is with normative content"). 
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doing, they are evaluating (i.e. really seeking to guide conduct)."153 
Nothing in the rule of perspective's future-focused gaze or its three-
prong attack tells us when law should "reflect" life and when "life's 
inequalities" require some kind of corrective push. Indeed, it may 
make this choice difficult to see by wrapping all the normative 
decisions into the adjectives we use to describe the interests claimed. 
Second, and perhaps most importantly, there is the lurking 
question whether all this rhetorical work will help the court decide. 
When courts engage in "interest-speak," they are trying to maintain 
an image of themselves as "realistic," but, at the same time, 
normatively authoritative. As Philip Bobbitt put it, "[d]octrinal 
argument as we know it today seeks to preserve the aesthetic of the 
rule of law in the new context created by realism."154 The balance 
between realist critique and common law image is worked out in 
concepts that flip-flop between life and law, between the descriptive 
and the prescriptive, between interests and compelling interests. Will 
a search for the intensifYing attributes of the interests claimed (what 
is compelling, what is clear, what is reasonable) tell us much about 
the individual or institutional consequences of the decision? 
Ultimately, there will be a result to these cases: the court will decide 
one way or another; it will either remake the decisions of legislatures 
or defer to political decisionmakers; it will honor the claims of social 
reality or brand societal ideals as prejudice. The risk here is that the 
rhetoric used to make these decisions does less to resolve those 
questions than it does to serve the institution (and to sustain its self-
image in a realist world). The risk is that, in making decisions, courts 
will ask questions, not about those who will have to live by their 
decision, but that they will ask and answer questions about its own 
identity. 
IV. READING CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 
We move, finally, to the way in which constitutional cases are 
"read" in the modern era. The story is familiar enough: one day a 
judge has occasion to use an expression that involves an adjective of 
weight, power, strength, or direction (for example, "compelling," 
"hard," or "fundamental"). Upon reading this opinion, later courts 
seize upon the adjective and conclude that the earlier case stands for 
a principle that the adjective announces. Over time and repeated 
"' R.M. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS 147 (corrected ed. 1972). 
154 BOBBIIT, supra note 61, at 42. 
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use, the chosen phrase is elevated to constitutional stardom. What is 
important for our purposes here is not the particular part of speech 
chosen, but the habit of mind and the unstated theoretical 
commitments that this reading entails. When lawyers transform the 
ofThand use of an intensifying adjective (for example, "fundamental") 
into a category of legal significance (for example, "fundamental 
rights"), they perform an act of enormous legal importance that may 
escape careful consideration or reflection. As I hope to show, this 
very reading of cases reflects a response to popular critiques of more 
traditional common law ideals of decisionmaking. 
A. Making Categories 
Let us take a closer look at the typical course of one-perhaps 
archetypal--example of this process. During the 1960s and early 
1970s, the Supreme Court announced what doctrinalists have come to 
call the "fundamental rights" strand of equal protection doctrine. 
Although the cases often dealt with very different subject matters, the 
word "fundamental" was quickly seized upon in law reviews and lower 
courts. The doctrine, as repeated, provided that litigants invoking 
"fundamental rights" were entitled to special protection; the 
government's interest, in such cases, would be strictly scrutinized. 155 
Some of the most difficult equal protection cases before the Court 
d . th 156 • 157 d . 158 d unng ese years--cases on race, votmg, repro uct10n, an 
criminal procedure159-relied, at least in part, on the idea of 
"fundamental rights."160 It was not long, however, before scholars and 
doctrinalists both wondered how far the category could be stretched. 
155 See STONE ET AL., sufrra note 115, at 842 (examining the intersection of equal 
protection and implied fundamental rights jurisprudence). 
156 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down an anti-
miscegenation statute). 
157 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (upholding one person-one 
vote). 
153 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down statute 
prohibiting provision of contraceptives). 
159 See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (striking down denial of 
right of indigent defendants to counsel on appeal). 
160 There were, of course, the equally controversial"fundamental rights" cases that 
did not explicitly invoke the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973) (abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception). 
On the differences between the "equal protection" and "due process" strands of 
fundamental rights jurisprudence, see Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981 ( 1979). 
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The Court ultimately called a halt161 but, in the course of the 
retrenchment, many came to question the original project-the 
doctrinal embrace of the word "fundamental."162 If treatises, case 
books, and scholarly articles are any measure, however, the 
fundamental rights strand of equal protection doctrine stuck, and 
stuck despite its tendency to unleash violent attacks on the Court's 
embrace of so-called unenumerated rights. 163 
How did we arrive here? If a traveler from a foreign legal culture 
turned to traditional legal materials governing the Equal Protection 
Clause, she would almost immediately be directed by the literature to 
Skinner v. Oklahoma. 164 Casebooks and treatises tell us that Skinner 
stands at the base of a pyramid of ascendingly complex "fundamental 
rights" cases.165 In Skinner, we learn, "[t]he Court first pointed to 
fundamental interests in the equal protection context."166 Similarly, 
treatises tell us that Skinner marked "the first time constitutional 
recognition of a fundamental right was held by the Supreme Court to 
d f I d. "b . ,167 man ate a norm o equa 1stn ut10n. 
When our visiting scholar turns to the Skinner opinion itself, 
however, she is likely to be quite disappointed. Scanning the opening 
161 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (refusing 
to find "education" a fundamental right necessitating strict scrutiny of differential 
school funding schemes). 
162 As justice Harlan famously put it in Shapiro v. Thompson: "I must reiterate that I 
know of nothing which entitles this Court to pick out particular human activities, 
characterize them as 'fundamental,' and give them added protection under an 
unusually stringent equal protection test." 394 U.S. 618, 662 (1969) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
163 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION 
OF THE LAw63-64 (1990) ("Skinnerrevived and remade the equal protection clause" in 
ways that "cannot avoid legislating" by permitting courts to decide which classifications 
should be treated like race). 
164 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that a state statute providing for the sterilization 
of habitual criminals violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
165 See, e.g., STONE ET AL., supra note 115, at 842; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 
116, § 14.27, at 797 ("The development of the contemporary concept of a 
constitutionally protected 'right of privacy' in sexual matters can be traced to the 
Supreme Court's decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma . ... This rationale ... established the 
basis for 'fundamental rights' analysis under the due process and equal protection 
guarantees ... ."). 
166 STONE ET AL., supra note 115, at 842. Thus, Supreme Court opinions discussing 
Skinner say things like: Skinner is among the cases that stand for the proposition that 
"[c]lassifications that burden, impinge or discriminate against such fundamental 
interests are 'highly suspect.'" Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 82 (1972) (Douglas,]., 
dissenting in part). 
167 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1463 (2d ed. 1988). 
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of the opinion, she would find no reference to the term 
"fundamental," nor to the announced shift in doctrine predicted by 
the treatises. She would note that the opinion opens by emphasizing 
that the case "touches a sensitive and important area of human 
rights," involving the "right to have offspring,"168 but would find no 
immediate reinforcement that the Court was forging a new rule, 
rather than merely making an introductory bow toward reversal. For, 
almost immediately after this announcement, the opinion launches 
into territory that seems ill-suited to express a clear break with the 
past. Instead, our foreign observer would read Justice Douglas's 
protestations that he was not departing from existing case law, 169 and 
would note his insistence that he was giving the state the same "large 
deference" accorded to the Court's post-New Deal equal protection 
cases. 170 And as she read on, she would become convinced that 
Skinner is primarily occupied with distinctions that play no part in its 
popular history. Justice Douglas devoted most of the opinion to the 
claim that the statute applied to petty thieves but not to white-collar 
criminals. A three-time thief, Douglas wrote, may be sterilized, but an 
embezzler may not, a distinction repeated throughout the opinion in 
. . d '1171 excruCiatmg eta1 . 
168 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536. 
169 See id. at 540-41. In a portion of the opinion typically excised from case books, 
Justice Douglas emphasized the Court's duty of deference toward states' choices, 
writing: 
[The states] may mark and set apart the classes and types of problems 
according to the needs and as dictated or suggested by experience .... [A] 
State is not constrained in the exercise of its police power to ignore experi-
ence which marks a class of offenders or a family of offenses for special treat-
ment. Nor is it prevented by the equal protection clause from confining "its 
restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be clearest." 
!d. at540 (quotingMillerv. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373,384 (1915)). 
170 See id. at 541 ("[W]e give Oklahoma that large deference which the rule of the 
foregoing cases requires."). 
171 Id. at 538-39 ("[H]e who embezzles property worth more than $20 is guilty of a 
felony. A clerk who appropriates over $20 from his employer's till and a stranger who 
steals the same amount are thus both guilty of felonies. If the latter repeats his act and 
is convicted three times, he may be sterilized. But the clerk is not subject to the pains 
and penalties of the Act no matter how large his embezzlements nor how frequent his 
convictions. A person who enters a chicken coop and steals chickens commits a 
felony; and he may be sterilized if he is thrice convicted. If, however, he is a bailee of 
the property and fraudulently appropriates it, he is an embezzler. Hence, no matter 
how habitual his proclivities for embezzlement are and no matter how often his 
conviction, he may not be sterilized." (citations omitted)). This "class" distinction is a 
repeated theme of justice Douglas's opinion: 
In terms of fines and imprisonment, the crimes oflarceny and embezzlement 
rate the same under the Oklahoma code. Only when it comes to sterilization 
1997] MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 1439 
Only if the foreign scholar continues past the lengthy discussions 
about petty thieves and embezzlers, past the earlier cases and the 
deference to be accorded to the state, will she find the reference to 
"fundamental" that modern writers emphasize. Six pages into the 
opinion, almost at its end, she finds these words: "We are dealing 
here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of 
man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very 
existence and survival of the race." 172 Here, the foreign scholar finds 
the doctrine of the opinion. 173 Not surprisingly, she may be moved to 
ask why we have invested this particular passage with more 
importance than the rule of deference, the arbitrary criminal law 
distinctions, or the biologically irreparable penalty. Indeed, she may 
wonder why the treatises have enthroned this passage as doctrine by 
means of the term "fundamental rights" when the passage itself 
speaks offundamentality "[to] the race." 174 
If pressed, we would have to admit that Skinner might be read a 
number of other ways and that it might have been doctrinalized 
differently. We might have said that Skinner is about class distinctions 
in criminal law;175 we might have said that Skinner is about the 
imposition of irreparable biological harm. 176 Indeed, I believe there is 
are the pains and penalties of the law different. The equal protection clause 
would indeed be a formula of empty words if such conspicuously artificial 
lines could be drawn. 
/d. at 542. "Sterilization of those who have thrice committed grand larceny, with 
immunity for those who are embezzlers, is a clear, pointed, unmistakable 
discrimination." /d. at 541. "Here there is no such saving feature. Embezzlers are 
forever free. Those who steal or take in other ways are not. If such a classification 
were permitted, the technical common law concept of a 'trespass' ... could readily 
become a rule of human genetics." /d. at 542. 
172 /d. at 541. 
"' See, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 116, § 14.27, at 797 ("Despite the broad 
police powers of the state, this classification violated the equal protection clause 
because it could not withstand the scrutiny to which the fundamental nature of the 
right involved demanded it be subjected."). 
174 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. 
175 Indeed, Skinner has been read with sympathy toward this position. See TRIBE, 
supra note 167, at 1464-65 (noting that the Court in Skinner was not only concerned 
with the "right to reproduce," but also evidenced "an even greater preoccupation with 
the notion that the state's classifications had been promulgated with their harshest 
effect against a relatively powerless minority, that of lower-class, as opposed to white-
collar, criminals," a distinction that Tribe likens to "invidious or suspect classifica-
tion"). 
176 See, e.g., Skinner, 316 U.S. at 546 (Jackson,]., concurring) ("There are limits to 
the extent to which a legislatively represented majority may conduct biological experi-
ments at the expense of the dignity and personality and natural powers of a minority-
even those who have been guilty of what the majority define as crimes."). 
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good reason to suspect that Justice Douglas may have feared that race 
was a lurking issue. He may have known that the statutory term 
triggering sterilization, crimes of "moral turpitude," had been used to 
cloak efforts to control, demean, and disenfranchise Mrican-
Americans.177 But, even if he did not, by 1942 Hitler had shown quite 
clearly how the eugenics movement, which inspired the Skinner 
statute, could be bent toward racist and, indeed, genocidal ends.178 In 
Skinner, Justice Douglas simply warned us of the racial implications of 
Oklahoma's statute in ways that seem oblique today, by noting the 
177 Several years earlier, in 1935, the Supreme Court noted the ways in which race 
was connected to the concept of "moral turpitude" in both the popular and legal 
imagination. In Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935), the Court struck down 
Alabama's practice of excluding blacks from juries under a statute that, among other 
things, barred jury service by those who had committed a "crime involving moral 
turpitude." In reaching its conclusion, the Court emphasized the jury commissioner's 
testimony that he did "not know of any negro in Morgan County over twenty-one and 
under sixty-five who ... has neuer been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude." /d. at 
598-99 (emphasis added). Decades later, the Supreme Court came to the same 
conclusion in Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985), holding that Alabama had 
cloaked blatant efforts to establish "white supremacy" by disenfranchising blacks in a 
constitutional provision that barred voting by persons who had committed a "crime 
involving moral turpitude." /d. at 228-32; see also Claudia Johnson, Without Tradition 
and Within Reason: judge Horton and Atticus Finch in Court, 45 ALA. L. REv. 483, 492-94 
(1994) (discussing the connection between crimes of moral turpitude and exclusions 
of black jurors and testimony by black witnesses). If, indeed, the statutory triggering 
factor, "crimes of moral turpitude," was known as a potential refuge for racism, then 
Douglas was correct when he made his famously difficult statement that the statute's 
classification was as potentially "invidious" as the "select[ion of] a particular race." 
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. It would also explain why Justice Douglas seemed to rely so 
heavily on Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), a case involving racial 
discrimination. 
178 The statute at issue in Skinner was passed during the heyday of the eugenics 
movement, a movement that spawned such overtly racist statutes as the one barring 
interracial marriages, struck down decades later in Loving v. ViJginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967). In America, the movement inspired dozens of state statutes aimed at 
protecting the public health. See Paul A. Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme 
Court: From Coercive Sterilization to Reproductive Freedom, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & 
POL'Y 1, 1 (1996) ("The most powerful vehicle of the eugenic ideology was the law."). 
It was in this atmosphere that the Court, in Buck v. Bell, upheld the sterilization of, as 
Justice Holmes put it, "imbeciles." 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). By the time Skinner was 
decided in 1942, the Nazi eugenics program had been in operation for almost a 
decade, and had called into question the American movement's premises and racist 
potential. See Lombardo, supra, at 11-12. Critics of the American movement charged 
that it branded minorities as genetically undesirable, "socially inadequate and a 
constant menace to the white race and society at large." Barbara L. Bernier, Class, 
Race, and Poverty: Medical Technologies and Socio-Political Choices, 11 HARV. BLACKl..ETfER 
J. 115, 130 (1994) (citing ELAINE ELLIS, STERILIZATION: A MENACE TO THE NEGRO 155 
(1937)). 
1997] MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 1441 
power of the remedy, "[i]n evil or reckless hands,"179 to "cause races or 
types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and 
d. ,180 1sappear. 
Skinner has come to mean, in many ways, what later cases-cases 
on abortion and contraception-have required it to mean. 181 The 
point here is not whether those later cases have interpreted Skinner 
correctly. 182 The point is that standard doctrinal treatments have 
179 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. This is, most likely, a reference to Hitler. Shortly after 
the Skinner opinion was issued, Jewish organizations turned to Douglas to help publi-
cize the plight of European Jews. Douglas declined until an impassioned telegram 
from the American Jewish Congress in February of 1943 implored him-in the name 
of the "two million Jews [that had] already been murdered by Hitler"-to offer his 
words at a Madison Square Garden rally. Telegram from Stephen S. Wise, American 
Jewish Congress, to William Douglas 2 (Feb. 25, 1943) (on file with Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress). Douglas wrote a draft of a speech that opened 
dramatically: "Barbarism has no restraints. A decade ago the Nazis commenced their 
systematic torture of the Jews. This savagery was now spread over the continent of 
Europe." William 0. Douglas, Radio Address from Madison Square Garden (Mar. 1, 
1943) (draft on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). 
Douglas was also aware of the light the Nazi practices shed on American racism. 
One of the first letters to congratulate Douglas on his Madison Square Garden speech 
was from the NAACP, noting that the organization particularly appreciated Douglas's 
"inclusion of the reference to discrimination based on color" (a reference that does 
not appear in the printed speech). Letter from Walter White, Secretary, NAACP, to 
William 0. Douglas (Mar. 5, 1943) (on file with Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress). 
180 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (emphasis added). The connection to race, eugenics, 
and history might have been clearer had Justice Douglas included a sentence he 
excised from his original draft: "The classification hardly has firmer constitutional 
basis than if in dealing with particular offenses it drew a line between rich and poor or 
between Nordic and other racial types." See William 0. Douglas, Draft of Opinion in Skinner 
(n.d.) (unpublished draft, on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) 
(emphasis added). Douglas substituted for this sentence a more oblique reference to 
the use of a rule of trespass to create "a rule of human genetics." Skinner, 316 U.S. at 
542. 
181 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing Skinner with other 
"fundamental rights" decisions). 
182 There are many wise and important reasons for this modern reading, not the 
least of which is that it allows us to forget that, applied literally, Justice Douglas's 
opinion would actually constitutionalize sterilization procedures as long as they were 
applied evenly, across the board. As Chief Justice Stone put it in his concurring 
opinion: "If Oklahoma may resort generally to the sterilization of criminals . . . I 
seriously doubt that the equal protection clause requires it to apply the measure to all 
criminals in the first instance, or to none." Skinner, 316 U.S. at 543 (Stone, CJ., 
concurring). By emphasizing the fundamental rights aspect of the case, and de-
emphasizing the equal protection aspect of the opinion, we harmonize the opinion in 
favor of our modern sensibilities that find sterilization offensive. See, e.g., Katharine T. 
Bartlett, Tradition, Change, and the Idea of Progress in Feminist Legal Thought, 1995 WIS. L. 
REv. 303, 310 & n.28 ( 1995) (articulating the widely held view that Skinner is really an 
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chosen to "read" the case in a particular way, remembering certain 
aspects and forgetting others-remembering the case for its adjectival 
enthusiasms rather than for its subject (criminal law), or its statute 
(crimes of "moral turpitude"), or the history of racist eugenics.183 
This rule of doctrinal recognition is far from controversial184 -it is 
shared by conservatives and liberals alike; indeed, it is necessary to 
their battle about the "existence" of fundamental rights. 185 For all 
intents and purposes, then, as the casebooks, treatises, and law 
reviews tell us, Skinner is a "fundamental rights" case.186 
B. Textual Anxieties 
A foreign observer, unsteeped in contemporary controversies, 
might note that this way of reading Skinner is far from given. Skinner 
could be categorized as a case about sterilization, or eugenics, or 
arbitrary distinctions within the criminal law. Focus might have been 
cast on the distinction between stealing chickens and stealing stocks, 
or on the history of the Court's shifting views on sterilization. 187 
Today, we doctrinalize Skinner with a different ideal in mind: 
Treatises and hornbooks find Skinners doctrine in a bit of text 
reconceived as methodology. 188 Not surprisingly, what most people 
remember about Skinner is neither its era nor its statute, but its fit 
within analytic structures, all summed up in Justice Douglas's 
"underground" substantive due process case because its equal protection rationale 
seems so unappealing). 
18
' I do not mean to suggest by this that Skinner was argued or briefed as a case 
involving race discrimination. See, e.g., Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of 
Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 235 n.94 (1991) (arguing that Skinner 
"did not (facially, at least) involve racial discrimination"). Instead, my point is that 
without Nazi racism raising the risk that a eugenics statute could be used to perpetuate 
the "dominant group," the case might well have been decided the other way, given the 
Court's prior holding in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). The risk that the statutory 
terms themselves may also have reflected racist ideology, see supra note 177, if known, 
would only have reinforced fears that the statute would be put to racist ends in 
America. 
184 Typical readings of Skinner tend to reduce the opinion's "rationale" to 
"establish [ing] the basis for 'fundamental right' analysis under the due process and 
equal protection guarantees." NOWAK& ROTUNDA, supra note 116, § 14.27, at 797. 
185 See BORK, supra note 163, at 63-64 (reading Skinner as a fundamental rights case, 
and therefore, an illegitimate exercise of judicial power). 
186 See supra notes 163, 165, 167 and accompanying text. 
187 See supra note 178 (discussing Buck v. Bel~ 274 U.S. 200 (1927) ). 
188 See supra notes 166, 167, 173 and accompanying text. 
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reference to procreation as "fundamental" to the race-transformed 
from a statement of fact to a statement of constitutional method. 
Our reading of Skinner thus warns us almost immediately that 
courts' sense of their job description has changed. Once upon a 
time, fact and holding, rather than method, provided the organizing 
principle of constitutional law. Open up a constitutional law treatise 
of the 1890s or the 1920s and compare that treatise to one of today: 
you will be stunned at the concreteness of its conceptual categories. 
You will find early equal protection law divided up into "Territorial 
Classification," "Corporations and Individuals," and "Public Utilities 
and Carriers," while the Commerce Clause is partitioned among 
"Vessels," "Regulation of Ports and Harbors," and "Pilotage," among 
other things. 189 No common law court would have put cases about 
criminal appeals and marriage certificates and sterilization all in one 
conceptual box. Today, we do: They are called "fundamental rights" 
cases, 190 and they are so called, not because they share facts or 
holdings, but because they share a method and a peculiarly modern 
approach toward constitutional issues. 
The tendency to read Skinner as constitutional methodology is 
more than simply a question of style or rhetoric-it reflects a 
changing image of how legal categories should be built. The term 
"fundamental rights" has a very rich jurisprudential meaning and a 
long constitutional history. 191 But our modern category of 
"fundamental rights" differs quite substantially from earlier 
understandings. Today, a student who described a death penalty or 
takings case as a case about "fundamental rights" might fail her 
constitutional law exam-not because the rights to liberty and 
property are not fundamental in jurisprudential or other senses, but 
189 HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 202-
28, 580-85 (4th ed. 1927); see also WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§§ 287-300 (2d ed. 1930) (including a 
variety of categories under the "commerce power" including "Base Ball," "Cab 
Service," and "Driving Sheep across State Lines"). 
1
9{) The subject matter of modern "fundamental rights" cases is notoriously diverse. 
See supra notes 156-64 (describing cases including those concerning travel, abortion, 
criminal appeals, sterilization, race, marriage, voting, welfare, and contraception). 
191 Numerous opinions, decided long before Skinner, referred to "fundamental" 
rights or interests. Typically, of course, the Court was referring to property or contract 
rights. See, e.g., Hancock v. City of Muskogee, 250 U.S. 454, 456 (1919) ("[I)t is 
essential to the protection of the fundamental rights of the property owner that ... he 
have notice .... "); Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916) (noting that the 
Fourteenth Amendment "was intended to preserve and protect fundamental rights 
long recognized under the common law system"). 
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because the doctrinal label would be wrong. The doctrinal label 
would be wrong because, in modern constitutional law, the term 
"fundamental rights" requires a conclusion not only that the right has 
a certain character and that it has triggered a similar "scrutiny" in the 
past, but also, crucially, that it is not specifically enumerated in the 
Constitution itself. 
As I have said before, all this could be coincidence, but it seems 
difficult to believe that such a doctrine-one that openly 
acknowledges the dangers of judging-does not reflect a changing 
ideal of law and courts. The "fundamental rights" rule acknowledges 
not only that doctrine is "made" (out of prior texts), but also that it 
may as well be "made up." As every law student knows, the doctrinal 
category "fundamental rights" cannot be described without 
considering the possibility that the Court has no business identifying 
such rights. Indeed, casebooks introduce students to the concept by 
warning them that there is something false about the entire 
enterprise-that courts simply identify "personal freedoms and 
declare them 'rights. '"192 Indeed, without this flavor of illegitimacy, 
there would be little to bind "fundamental rights" cases together; the 
category's theory of sameness depends upon the fear of doctrinal 
failure. 
If we can see courts' self-consciousness in the content of the 
category, it also emerges in the way a case like Skinner is read. Skinner 
becomes a case not only about the lack of constitutional text, but the 
increasing importance of the Court's own texts. The common law 
ideal imagined doctrinal rules as the distillation of precedent, 
transcending the words used by a court. As Judge Posner has noted, 
"[w]e are not afraid that we would lose the meaning of negligence if 
we put it in different words from those used by Learned Hand, or 
William Prosser, or some other authoritative expositor of the 
concept."193 By contrast, our category of fundamental rights is tied to 
its "particular verbal formulation." 194 To use any different adjective, 
or to describe the right involved at a different level of specificity, is to 
192 DANIELA. FARBERET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 381 (1993). A leading constitu-
tional law treatise makes no bones about it: "All that can be said with certainty is that a 
majority of the Supreme Court Justices have selected a group of individual civil 
liberties which do not have a clear textual basis in the Constitution or its Amendments 
and declared those rights to be 'fundamental."' NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 116, 
§ 11. 7, at 404; see also NAGEL, supra note 1, at 196 ("The principal characteristic of a 
fundamental interest appears to be that the Court calls the interest fundamental."). 
19
' RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 248 ( 1990). 
194 /d. 
1997] MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 1445 
extinguish the possibility of applying the doctrine. Indeed, if a court 
today were to apply the "fundamental rights" doctrine without using 
that particular phrase, it is doubtful that the resulting opinion would 
be read or classified as a "fundamental rights" case. 
If one doubts that there is anything particularly "modern" about 
this shifting sense of the doctrinal art, all one has to do is to take the 
modern grammar and place it in an earlier age. For decades, the 
Court anchored its constitutional jurisprudence in the "police 
power."195 No one argued at the time (indeed, it seems almost absurd 
to contemplate) that we would lose the police power if it were 
described in any different way. The "police power" aspired to a 
conceptualism dependent upon a class of factual and legal 
circumstances in which courts would defer to the exercise of state 
power. 196 Today, when we explain the "police power" to our students, 
we do not pick up the dictionary and point to the plain meaning of 
"police." Instead, we offer examples of cases that fall within the core 
meaning of the concept-examples of quarantine laws and inspection 
measures. We do this instinctively, unreflectively, as if we knew that 
the term did not obtain its meaning from the dictionary definitions of 
its components, but that it aspires to a conceptualism built upon an 
older ideal in which doctrine is something distilled, rather than 
expressed, in fact or holding. 197 
When we read a case like Skinner for its embrace of "fundamental 
rights," we accept a changing image of the virtues and vices of 
judging. In a common law world, law is both permanent and 
transcendent; in a modern law world, it is assumed to be both 
contingent and potentially illegitimate. In a common law world, 
authority and legitimacy depend upon courts' ability to transmit and 
perpetuate an unwritten tradition by marrying law and life in 
holdings;198 in a modern world, authority and legitimacy depend upon 
methodological certainty. In a common law world, where courts 
195 See supra note 56. 
196 Indeed, as Morton Horwitz tells us, the "police power" derived from common 
law concepts. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 28 ("During the 1870s and 1880s, police 
power analysis was regarded as largely derivable from categories developed in the 
common law of nuisance."). 
197 See Meyer, supra note 92, at 432 (noting that in this "Blackstonian tradition, 
because the authority oflaw lies outside the judge's words, opinions ... are measured 
against the reason and general principles that emanate from all past decisions, bound 
together as a coherent whole"). 
198 See id. at 465 ("Law, from the standpoint of the common law judge, is the 
coherence, sense, and significance of a set of human actions."). 
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imagine themselves as the conveyors of precedent, rather than the 
"writers" of text, categories are shaped in the image of precedent;199 in 
the modern world, where courts imagine themselves as text-writers, 
law is what courts have "said." 
Here, as in my other examples, we see doctrine struggling to 
acknowledge its critics, but, at the same time, leaving room for more 
traditional ideals. Drawing boundaries like "fundamental rights" not 
only acknowledges critique, but also cabins it. If the "fundamental 
rights" cases are the ones in which courts risk "making" law 
illegitimately, that means that somewhere, outside the category, there 
are cases where a determinate, clear, constitutional text governs. In 
this way, the doctrine embraces the critique (potential illegitimacy) 
and, at the same time, holds out hope for a legitimate doctrine built 
upon a self-applying Constitution. 
As we have seen earlier, however, there is a price to be paid for 
this kind of reading, a price exacted in something more than the 
dullness of a style that is "methodological [ly] obsess [ ed]. "200 Every 
time the Court must draw the line between the "fundamental rights" 
cases and others, it must not only choose sides, but must also choose 
between institutional ideals. When a litigant asks a court to recognize 
an unenumerated right, the court must not only weigh the parties' 
arguments and the demands of prior cases, but must also contend 
with the potential institutional consequences of its choice. If this 
choice is inevitable in some sense, the question remains whether it is 
best accomplished when the institutional choice is embedded within 
doctrine-when courts are not asking the question "how will this 
change our role?" or "is there another, better institution to decide 
199 Take, for example, the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" effects upon 
commerce-frequently cited as a classic example of nineteenth-century formalism, 
based on the case of United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895). If one reads 
carefully, the Court in E. C. Knight never set out the distinction in those terms, nor did 
it use such a distinction as a test or doctrinal standard. Instead the adjective "direct" 
served to distinguish prior holdings. See, e.g., id. at 15-16 ("In Gibbons v. Ogden, Brown 
v. Maryland, and other cases often cited, the state laws, which were held inoperative, 
were instances of direct interference with ... interstate ... commerce .... "). 
Although our modern textual approach tends to focus us on the specific terms used-
"direct interference"-nineteenth-century treatises did not understand the case in 
these terms. E.C. Knight does not appear under a separate category for "direct" or 
"indirect" effects on commerce, but, instead, under the heading of an "anti-trust" case. 
See, e.g., WILLOUGHBY, supra note 189, at 34~5 (discussing E.C. Knight under "Anti-
Trust," rather than "Commerce" heading). 
200 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 99. 
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this case?", but, instead, whether the case falls within the modern 
doctrinal category we know as "fundamental rights." 
The danger here is that courts will confuse the real-life 
consequences of their decisions with their own institutional identity. 
What matters more in convincing us that Skinnerwas rightly decided: 
Justice Douglas's use of the term "fundamental," or the dangers, so 
apparent at the time, that the Oklahoma statute could risk the 
biological eradication of undesirable minorities? Modern doctrinal 
readings tend to steer us away from history and toward the opinion's 
text, telling us to "read" the case as one about "fundamental rights." 
This, of course, moves us quickly toward questions about judicial 
legitimacy and away from the lived consequences of decision. Once 
the label "fundamental rights" is invoked, we do not ask about the 
persons likely to be sterilized or their relationship to the "dominant" 
group; we do not ask about the institutional consequences of a ruling 
that would leave such decisions in the hands of legislatures. Instead, 
we focus on questions about the Court itself, its methods and its 
legitimacy. 
Should Skinner arise again, I doubt seriously that the public would 
tolerate a court that refused to exercise judicial review to strike down 
a similar sterilization statute. And yet, despite this consensus, Skinner 
continues to draw us into bone-numbingly familiar debates about the 
legitimacy of judicial review.201 We are back again to a question I have 
asked before: whether a constitutional rhetoric that seeks to tame the 
Court's critics is more likely to find answers to questions about the 
Court than about those who must live by its decisions. The Supreme 
Court began this century with a constitutional arrogance we now 
know as "Lochner." Could all of our work against such arrogance risk a 
new constitutional narcissism? 
V. INSTITUTIONAL IDEALS AND THE DEMANDS OF DECISION 
These doctrinal histories are modern, not because the words that 
they use are peculiarly modern, not because the "layered-look" reveals 
a modern reverence for the bureaucratic or academic, and not 
because judges seek to hide the Constitution from the people.202 
201 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 163, at 64 (criticizing Skinners reading of the Equal 
Protection Clause as starting down the road to situations where the Court "cannot 
avoid legislating the justices' personal views"). 
202 Cf supra Part I (citing other work embracing these factors as at least a partial 
explanation of the formulaic quality of modern constitutional doctrine). 
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These stories are modern because they reflect a distinctively modern 
struggle in which doctrinal argument tries to contend with a dying 
common law ideal. 
In a sense, this should seem surprising because it reverses the 
traditional relationship between doctrine and theory by suggesting 
that theory-what we believe courts to be and doctrine to do-may 
become hardened within doctrinal categories.203 On the other hand, 
from a slightly different vantage point, it seems quite natural indeed. 
For, once we come to see that the identity of concepts, their 
sameness, "is conferred on objects by their being held in the embrace 
of a theoretical structure,"204 it becomes easier to see how institutional 
ideals might become embedded within doctrine. From such a 
perspective, writing doctrine is not only a process of arbitrarily 
choosing categories, but of rewriting with each choice prevalent 
stories of what doctrine is and courts are. 
A. Langdell Redux? 
The standard understanding that modern constitutional doctrine 
has traded in one set of formalisms for another is correct, but 
incomplete. It is surely right in the sense that we have categories that 
look increasingly formulaic. It is also right in the sense that, for all of 
doctrine's supposed modern bow toward a more "realistic" outlook 
(its embrace of perspective, candor about its weaknesses, and 
unembarrassed acceptance of lawmaking), we have recreated, in 
many ways, the very kind of essentialist discourse that realist scholars 
deplored. Where we once looked for the essence of the "police 
power," today we look for the essence of "compelling interests." We 
have traded in one set of hopes of transcendence for another. Once 
transcendence was sought in history, stability, and stare decisis; today, 
it is sought in prediction, candor, and clarity of textual expression. In 
these senses, the classical style remains steadfastly with us, albeit 
wearing new armor. 
Even so, the new doctrinal orthodoxy differs from the old. It is 
very difficult to translate our modern doctrinal grammar-turning 
••• If I am right, then we can expect to see this process continue as popularized 
versions of yesterday's academic fads become tomorrow's embedded doctrinal forms. 
I suspect that the "new wave" of this doctrinalism will come from law and economics. 
See, e.g., McCloud v. Testa, 97 F. 3d 1536, 1551 (6th Cir. 1996) (borrowing the language 
of economics--of market failure, "collective action," and "negative externalities" -in a 
First Amendment patronage case). 
204 DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 59 (discussing the work ofW.V. Quine). 
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the "police power" into a "compelling police interest"-without 
realizing that something has changed. What my doctrinal histories 
have tried to show is that sometimes we can catch a glimpse, on the 
face of doctrine, of changing ideals of the institution. Those who 
study institutions regularly from the vantage point of a "foreigner" are 
well aware of the ways in which an institution's self-image is reflected 
in the concepts it embraces. Anthropologist Mary Douglas argues 
that every societal institution "needs a formula that founds its 
rightness in reason and in nature."205 These formulas represent a set 
of analogies from which the institution creates its stock concepts, the 
categories in which it "thinks."206 Because of the transaction costs of 
intellectual effort, these analogies become the "default position," 
resorted to without thought and even in the face of changing 
realities. In Douglas's terms, doctrine-in the move from the police 
power to clear law-reflects a shift in the structures of doctrinal 
legitimacy and normalcy. We have formalisms that are new, not 
because they are any less formal (formalism is inevitable within 
doctrinalism), and not because courts are trying to evade the people 
or have borrowed the style of academics, but because the new 
formalisms depend upon a different metaphor of the "natural legal 
order," one in which courts have given themselves permission to treat 
their opinions as texts, to see their job as a matter of social 
arbitration, to acknowledge with candor that law is uncertain. 
Douglas's theory does much to explain why we have seen that 
doctrine both absorbs critique and then cabins it. If her theory is 
right, and institutions seek to mold the unpalatable into sustaining 
images, then that may help to explain the conflicting signals sent by 
modern constitutional rhetoric. If doctrine had truly sought to 
embrace the modernist critique-law's indeterminacy or relativity or 
205 /d. at 45; see also id. at ll2 ("Any institution that is going to keep its shape needs 
to gain legitimacy by distinctive grounding in nature and in reason: then it affords to 
its members a set of analogies with which to explore the world and with which to 
justifY the naturalness and reasonableness of the instituted rules, and it can keep its 
identifiable continuing form. Any institution then starts to control the memory of its 
members; it causes them to forget experiences incompatible with its righteous image, 
and it brings to their minds events which sustain the view of nature that is comple-
mentary to itself. It provides the categories of their thought, sets the terms for self-
knowledge, and fixes identities."). 
206 See id. at 45 (noting that "the entrenching of an institution is essentially an 
intellectual process"). 
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social dependency-it would have had to make itself "irrelevant."207 
Instead, it used its characteristic methods, the creation of hard-edged 
categories, to bound the critique. A doctrinal rhetoric of "unclear 
law" bows to the age's meaning skepticism but, in the end, posits that 
there is, somewhere, clear law to be found. 208 A doctrinal rhetoric of 
"perspective" bows to the notion that "it is all relative," but still leaves 
room for courts to hold that only some perspectives-the reasonable 
ones-count.209 A doctrinal rhetoric of social "interests" bows to the 
notion that law is no longer autonomous, but still leaves enormous 
room for the court to define interests as fundamental or important or 
compelling, meanings that have no analogue outside of law. The 
move from critique to hard-edged category leaves space where 
something like the common law ideal still lives-where law can be 
clear, objective, and autonomous-alongside a rhetoric that is 
distinctly more likely to acknowledge doctrine's weaknesses. 
The danger is not that modern constitutional doctrine has lost 
positive features of the common law ideal. (Indeed, that ideal is alive 
and well, and is experiencing something of a revival in academic 
circles.) 210 The danger is that doctrine's struggle with institutional 
self-criticism tends to make real-life decisions dependent upon the 
resolution of difficult, and recurring, theoretical disputes. As Mary 
Douglas puts it, the natural metaphors chosen by institutions pick and 
choose "allies and opponents," which leads to a standard repertoire of 
"future relations" between the two. 211 Consider the fate of the clear 
law rule. As we have seen, to apply the doctrine (and decide the 
case), the court often finds itself mired in deep and difficult 
theoretical questions about "what is law" and "how clear must clear 
be."212 The boundaries of clear law must not only do the work of 
decisionmaking, they must decide by trying to bound the 
indeterminacy critique that the doctrine assumes. Similar problems 
are posed by rules of perspective. To apply the doctrine, the court 
must not only find the relevant interests and expectations, it must 
adopt the proper "perspective" or "methodology" with respect to 
207 GILMORE, supra note 5, at 13 (enunciating the familiar scholarly critique that 
"the doctrine which may be found enshrined in case report and treatise is neither 
important nor relevant"). 
208 See supra Part II. 
209 See supra Part III. 
210 See supra note 16 (noting this revival). 
211 DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 63. 
212 See supra Part II. 
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those social interests, a struggle that asks it to address difficult 
theoretical questions about whether and when law must defer to life 
and when it must command otherwise.213 Rules of perspective must 
not only help the court to decide individual cases, they must do so by 
bounding the critique that inspired them-by placing boundaries on 
the notion that the law is a matter of relativism and social deference. 
Finally, consider concepts such as "fundamental rights" in the equal 
protection context. To apply the doctrine, the court must not only 
struggle with the generality with which to describe the right claimed, 
but also with the legitimacy of judicial review itself.214 Again, this 
category must not only help the court to choose, it must do so by 
confronting the critique of judicial activism and law creation 
embedded within the concept. Staving off institutional criticism by 
incorporating that criticism within doctrine means that the doctrine 
will continue to generate the very theoretical controversies that 
inspired it-over and over again. 
B 'T''h "B S "215 if n... . 'T''h C • 1 , e ony tructure o rracttce: 1 , e ase 
If we are truly realists, we will acknowledge that doctrine has 
successfully resisted the best, and most pretentious, intellectual efforts 
of this century by bending its critics' claims to new and formalistic 
ends. We will remember Karl Llewellyn's insistence that the 
Constitution is an institution, a practice, and a means of governing.216 
We will also hear what the foreign observers have told us, that 
institutions "think" ideas that sustain themselves and, in doing so, 
inevitably seek to mold the ideas of their critics into fare more 
palatable to perceived institutional needs.217 
If we are to avoid romantic yearnings for an earlier age, and the 
familiar arguments that this yearning spawns, we must understand 
m See supra Part III. 
2
" See supra Part IV. 
215 See TwiNING, supra note 62, at 176 (quoting Karl Llewellyn). 
216 See Llewellyn, supra note 19, at 17. 
217 One commentator notes: 
Institutions systematically direct individual memory and channel our 
perceptions into forms compatible with the relations they authorize. They fix 
processes that are essentially dynamic, they hide their influence, and they 
rouse our emotions to a standardized pitch on standardized issues. Add to all 
this that they endow themselves with rightness and send their mutual 
corroboration cascading through all the levels of our information system. No 
wonder they easily recruit us into joining their narcissistic self-contemplation. 
DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 92. 
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doctrine's real institutional limitations. Consider, for a moment, the 
site for doctrine's creation-the "case."218 Relative to other 
institutions, such as markets or legislatures, adjudication is a 
demanding institution. It requires decision at the same time it 
enjoins passivity. Unlike other legal institutions, such as markets or 
legislatures, courts typically have no choice to not decide.219 Someone 
will, in the end, win or lose. At the same time, courts have little 
power to set the agenda of their decisions. As Neil Komesar has put 
it, a ·~udge can do nothing until a litigant takes the initiative."220 It is 
the litigant's offering of facts and law to which the court must 
respond. 
Faced with the imperative to decide in an atmosphere where 
there is little ability to control what is to be decided, courts strive 
mightily to control what they can-the reasons that they give for their 
decisions. Perhaps, then, it should not be surprising to find that the 
reasons often appear hard-edged and formalistic. In a sense, the only 
ideas that adjudication can possibly use are ideas that can be placed 
in the service of decision (as opposed to knowing, understanding, or 
reaching agreement). 221 The "piled adjectives" now betray their 
attractiveness. The pile seems to offer a way to decide-if the law is 
clear, if the right is fundamental, if the perspective is reasonable, then 
218 However changed by modern litigation, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the judge in 
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (discussing the development of 
public law litigation); Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword, Public 
Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1982) (same), the structure of 
"the case" remains the dominant scene for the performance of adjudication in 
America. 
219 See, e.g., BOBBITI, supra note 14, at 183 (noting that cases "require a decision, not 
a calculation or an interpretation, or even a passionate conviction"); EISENBERG, supra 
note 100, at 159 (noting that even when asked a novel issue, courts will not turn 
claimants away, telling them that because of the novelty, there was no law at the time 
and, therefore, the case cannot be decided); cf. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) ( 1962) (recounting ways in 
which courts exercise "passive" virtues to avoid decision). 
220 KOMESAR, supra note 21, at 128; see id. at 125 ("UJudges are far less able to 
initiate decision-making than legislators. Legislators can resolve a social issue without 
anyone officially and formally bringing the issue to their attention .... Judges must 
await action brought by moving parties, often private parties."). 
221 This is what, in the end, distinguishes the law-talk of opinionwriting from the 
law-talk of legislatures. Juxtapose the Cong;ressional Record with a Supreme Court 
opinion. Both "make" law, but read quite differently because the institutions demand 
different kinds of decisions which, in turn, lead to different decisional narratives. 
Legislature-talk is the talk of consensus-building; opinionwriting is the talk of choice. 
Self-legitimation, within the Congress, means a speech that moves the public, not one 
that would win a case in the Supreme Court. 
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the case is "decided"-won or lost. Once the illusive legal "property" 
is found (the "fundamentality" of the right or the "compellingness" of 
the interest), the case's choice appears self-evident. (And, indeed, it 
is in some sense inevitable since all the normative choices have been 
pre-packaged into the original dispositional proposition.) 222 This 
does not mean that the reasons announced in the opinion in fact 
decide cases-they may not. It does mean that doctrine's form will 
always be placed in the service of, and molded by, the court's need to 
decide. 
This institutional understanding goes a long way toward 
explaining why the modernist critique never really had a chance to 
transform doctrine in any fundamental way without also changing the 
institutional demands of adjudication.223 It also goes a long way 
toward explaining why doctrine took what it did from its critics. 
There are plenty of critical insights that doctrine ignored: Modern 
doctrine does not adopt empirical tests for hypothetical verdicts; it 
does not announce a principle for every counter-principle (or at least 
it does not try to do this); and it does not preface its holdings by 
warning that "whatever follows is inherently political." Why not? 
Because to adopt any of these principles as doctrine is to undermine 
courts' self-perceived identity relative to other institutions. A court 
that decides based on the latest Gallup poll does not distinguish itself 
from a political consultants' committee. A court that sends 
hypothetical verdicts to an outside research firm does not distinguish 
itself from a university sociology department. A court that borrows 
from Jack Balkin's school of point-counterpoint224 does not 
distinguish itself from a debating society. Doctrine makes itself in an 
institutional image and it will borrow only those forms that it 
perceives will sustain that image. 
222 See George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 953 
(1985) (arguing that the concept of the "reasonable man" packs into itself, from the 
start, normative decisions); Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive 
Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 596, 636-37, 645-46 (1981) (making a similar 
argument about prepacking in a different context). For an in-depth look at how this 
happens in the common law context, see Nourse, supra note 19, at 1384-89. 
223 Where the structure of litigation has changed, see Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and 
Resistance, 92 YALE LJ. 585 (1983), doctrine has had to make enormous strides to keep 
up. 
224 See J. M. Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 3 
(1986) (arguing that legal thinking should be "viewed dialectically as a continuing 
series of struggles between various sets of opposed ideas"). 
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C. A "Living Doctrine" 
Our best hope of resisting the standard arguments and replies 
may simply be to accept the institutional reality. Let us embrace the 
embarrassing and recognize that formalism will remain as long as the 
institutional realities of the case remain the same and that rhetoric 
alone cannot do away with the "requirement of a decision."225 Let us 
focus on the ways in which doctrine "lives" in the world. The greater 
danger is not that the Court is boring or impenetrable, but that its 
decisions forsake "lived relations" for institutional purity. Our 
categories must aspire to a more modest, and therefore more helpful, 
image-an image that is incremental and dynamic, one in which 
doctrine aspires to recognize that every category reflects a judgment 
of alternatives about a set of relationships, relationships between the 
Court's past and its future, between the litigants themselves, and 
between the Court and other institutional decisionmakers. 
The realists' own philosophical patron saint,John Dewey, laid the 
groundwork for a dynamic understanding of legal relationships when 
he urged that we temper our search for knowledge built on 
description. In his book, How We Think, Dewey contrasts two kinds of 
conceptual knowledge. 226 The first is dispositional. When asked to 
describe "metal," we offer properties or qualities of metal: 
"[s]moothness, hardness, glossiness, and brilliancy."227 Dewey 
contrasts this understanding with one in which metal is not defined 
by its properties, but through its chemical relationships and 
"interaction in constituting other substances."228 He urges that "our 
conceptions attain a maximum of definite individuality" if "they show 
how things depend upon one another or influence one another, 
instead of expressing the qualities that objects possess statically."229 
Metal is no longer defined by brittleness, but as "any chemical 
element that enters into combination with oxygen so as to form a 
base."230 Dewey concludes by claiming that such knowledge allows us 
to "lay hold of the dynamic ties that hold things together in a 
. I h . ,231 contmuous y c angmg process. 
225 BOBBITI, supra note 14, at 39 (emphasis omitted). 
226 JOHN DEWEY, HOW WE THINK 131-34 (1910). 
227 /d. at 133. 
228 /d. at 134. 
229 /d. 
2!!0 /d. 
231 /d. 
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One need not embrace Dewey's hope for a science of relational 
understandings232 to see that his analysis holds out hope that we may 
cultivate intellectual habits that strive toward understanding the 
dynamic relationships that bind us together. We have all had 
experiences similar to sitting in an optician's chair and "knowing" 
whether lens number one is "better or worse" than lens number two 
without having the vaguest idea about how the images differ optically. 
Litigation suffers from similar limitations. Sometimes it is far easier 
to decide whether claim number one or claim number two presents a 
better relationship between the parties, a better relationship to the 
court's prior decisions and its future ones, and a better relationship 
between courts and other legal institutions,233 than it is to articulate 
the essential differences between the claims. Should we give up 
making the right decision simply because we do not know the precise 
measurements that make the decision right, even if our reasons, 
however inarticulate, are good enough to choose among alternatives 
and thus to "live by"? Or should we simply recognize that, if courts 
fail in their obligation to articulate reasons, this failure may be 
corrected over time, while a failure to make the right decision could 
force people to live in ways that are far from easily repaired? 
232 The skeptic in us all will hesitate at this point and argue that all relationships 
can be redescribed as dispositions. That is true, but it does not eliminate the 
possibility that some ways of thinking may be more "dynamic" than others. Asking 
whether and how the law should regulate the relationship between state and citizen is 
a different question than asking whether certain "fundamental rights" should be 
protected. The former question suggests an intellectual operation in which we 
"value," "create," or "imagine" the relationship; the latter suggests a search for a legal 
object with a particular property. To the extent the latter seems to suggest that there 
is something to be found, it invites a backward-looking search for something "prior"-
whether it is a legal concept or a meaning. To the extent the former seems to suggest 
that we need to "create" this relationship, it sends our search in the opposite direction, 
inviting engagement and commitment. 
233 This focus on "relational" understandings is precisely what the modern doc-
trinal grammar tends to resist. The three-prong test actually fragments the key 
relational questions by drawing our attention first to one side of the case, then to the 
other, leaving the "relational" elements to be summed up in the amorphous and 
ubiquitous "nexus requirement." Moreover, the focus on textual expression tends to 
turn our attention to the court's own language rather than the parties' dispute, 
placing the judges-not the parties-at the center of the legal universe. Finally, the 
law's self-consciousness of its own creation tends to obscure doctrine's understanding 
of its relationship with the past, veiling analogy's modest virtues with a heavy-lidded 
textuality. Gone from view is the overarching question of the state's relationship to its 
citizens; instead, the only relationship we are likely to see is the relationship of an 
object and its attributes-of a law to its clarity, of rights to their fundamentality, or of 
the parties to their expectations. 
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I am not arguing that we should not care about the reasons courts 
give, but only that a methodological focus may strike an unhealthy 
balance between rhetoric and result. To press formalism toward a 
modest dynamism requires a doctrine placed in the service of those 
for whom doctrine must work, not to assuage judges' or scholars' 
fears, but the fears of the parties and the rest of us who must live by it. 
In Charles Dickens's Hard Times, 234 Gradgrind asked his pupil Bitzer 
to define "horse." Bitzer responded: "Quadruped. Gramnivorous. 
Forty teeth, namely twenty-four grinders, four eye-teeth, and twelve 
incisive. Sheds coat in the spring; in marshy countries sheds hoofs 
too. Hoofs hard, but requiring to be shod with iron." "Now," says 
Gradgrind to the pupil he calls "girl number twenty," "[y]ou know 
what a horse is. "235 Of course, this is far from a horse. "No horseman 
ever rode a 'gramnivorous quadruped,"' "[n]o gambler ever bet on 
236 
one," and "[n]o sculptor ever 'dreamed one out of stone."' The 
people who must use the horse-for their art, for their vice, or simply 
for transportation-are "involved in a living relation to a living 
animal," and that relation will be reflected in the categories they use 
to describe the animal.237 Lest constitutional courts become 
Gradgrindian, they should be careful to remember that doctrine 
serves to guide action in the world, not the other way around. 
Consider what might have been the doctrine of Skinner238 if the 
Court had asked whether the Constitution would permit a lived 
relationship of the kind the state sought-if it would permit a 
majority to threaten the biological eradication of an undesirable 
minority. Consider how we might have understood Skinners 
relationship to the Court's past holdings if the Court had more 
openly acknowledged that Nazi experimentation had called into 
question the eugenic assumptions of Buck v. Bele39 Or consider how 
we might have appreciated the Court's exercise of judicial power if 
the Court had justified its assertion of power by noting that the 
alternative-leaving the question to the political departments-posed 
greater dangers, dangers that had ended, already, in world war. Even 
if these are contested judgments, they are lived ones, far richer than 
the ofihand phrases with which Skinner is now associated. 
2
" CHARLES DICKENS, HARD TIMES (Oxford Univ. Press 1955) (1854). 
235 /d. at5. 
2
'
6 jOHN CIARDI & MILLER WILUAMS, HOW DOES A POEM MEAN? 1 (2d ed. 1975). 
2
'
7 /d. at 2 . 
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1997] MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 1457 
Appreciating the real institutional limits of doctrine is not a 
matter of resignation, but a moral consideration in and of itself.240 
Doctrine's words "are not just for fun and mental exercise."241 A poet 
may misuse the word "mere" and be branded a failure, and a scientist 
may misinterpret the word "mere" and be decried as unintelligible, 
but whether and how a jury hears the word "mere" may mean, quite 
literally, someone's life.242 We need to appreciate that "[w]ords 
cannot be isolated from the deeds they perform ... [n]ot only 
because they represent or reflect on actions but because they 
themselves, literally, are actions."243 Even if we know that the line 
between politics and law is far from clear, we must remember that 
"[i] t is institutions which validate the Words, not the Words which 
validate the institutions."244 In the end, I think it takes a foreigner to 
our doctrinal culture to remind us that "[t]he most profound 
decisions about justice are not made by individuals as such, but by 
individuals thinking within and on behalf of institutions."245 
240 See HANs-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 281 (Crossroad 1986) (1975) 
(recounting the Aristotelian idea that "knowledge of a dynamic kind" is knowledge 
with a "purpose" to "determine and guide action"). 
241 Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Ununitten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 211, 
215 (1988); see also Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE LJ. 1601 (1986) 
(discussing how the legal interpretation of an act leads to punishment, violence, and 
pain). 
242 See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF jUDGES 56-59 (1993) (discussing 
the degree to which the Supreme Court's decision in a death penalty case depended 
upon its interpretation of the term "mere" in a "mere sympathy" jury instruction). 
245 PAUL DE MAN, Shelley Disfigured, in THE RHETORIC OF ROMANTICISM 93, 102-03 
(1984), quoted in Adam Thurschwell, Reading the Law, in THE RHETORIC OF LAW, supra 
note 43, at 275, 304. 
244 Llewellyn, supra note 19, at 17. 
245 DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 124. 
